- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Reductionism1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 30/06/2020 00:11:31): Reductionism
- Reductionism in the field of Personal Identity has much the same meaning as elsewhere in philosophy, namely:-
- Explanatory Reduction: explaining PID in terms of simpler concepts4, or
- Ontological Reduction: saying that persons5 are “really” other things, or are made up of or constituted by6 other things.
- This contrasts with the Simple View7, which denies either of these options.
- Currently, my thoughts on the matter are derived from:-
→ "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Reductionism", and
→ "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism",
but I will add to the topic further over time.
- From my perspective, the interesting element is Garrett’s consideration of Phase Sortals8.
- "Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons" claims that Animalism9 is a non-reductionist account of PID – indeed, the best one!
- Derek Parfit is credited with introducing the term “Reductionism” into the field of Personal Identity from elsewhere in philosophy, and a number of items on the reading list are responses to his ideas. I’ve not included any of his own writings under this head – see my Note on Parfit10 for these.
- Of course, Reductionism in the field of Personal Identity is a subset of Reductionism generally in science, and is open – invalidly in my view – to the same “nothing buttery” objections. I’ve included those items I’ve actually read that fall within this wider remit, but not (much) otherwise.
- An area that might be included under this heading is the question of reductionism in the philosophy of mind11 – whether (for instance) mental events are reducible to physical events. I believe and assume that they are, and anything I have to say on the topic will be covered under my Note on Dualism12.
- For a page of Links13 to this Note, Click here. There were too many links to perform an updating run, so I’ve just eyeballed the results and selected a few titles.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read14, include the following:-
- "Alexander (Denis) - Review of 'Why Us?' by James Le Fanu", Alexander
- "Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Preface", Baillie
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' by Nancey Murphy", Baker
- "Campbell (John) - The Reductionist View of the Self", Campbell
- "Cassam (Quassim) - Kant and Reductionism", Cassam
- "Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons", Cassam
- "Cassam (Quassim) - Reductionism and First-Person Thinking", Cassam
- "Catterson (Troy) - Introduction to Synthese Special Issue on Personal Identity", Catterson
- "Coliva (Annalisa) - Review of Gasser & Stefan, Eds. - Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?", Coliva
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Soul, Body and Survival: Introduction - Soul or Body?", Corcoran
- "Crane (Tim) - Body", Crane
- "Doepke (Frederick) - Spatially Coinciding Objects", Doepke
- "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism", Garrett
- "Garrett (Brian) - Parfit and 'What Matters'", Garrett
- "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Reductionism", Garrett
- "Garrett (Brian) - Persons", Garrett
- "Hawking (Stephen) - The Objections of an Unashamed Reductionist", Hawking
- "Hempel (Carl) - Theoretical Reduction", Hempel
- "Hempel (Carl) - Theories and Theoretical Explanation", Hempel
- "Hofstadter (Douglas) - Reductionism and religion", Hoffstadter
- "Lizza (John) - Persons, Humanity, & the Definition of Death: Preface", Lizza
- "Markosian (Ned) - Time", Markosian
- "Nagel (Thomas) - Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness", Nagel
- "Nagel (Thomas) - The View from Nowhere: Introduction", Nagel
- "Nagel (Thomas) - What is it Like to Be a Bat?", Nagel
- "Natsoulas (Thomas) - The Primary Source of Intentionality", Natsoulas
- "Noonan (Harold) - Identity and Personal Identity", Noonan
- "Oderberg (David) - Johnston on Human Beings", Oderberg
- "O'Hear (Anthony) - Scientific Reductions", O’Hear
- "Papineau (David) - Introducing Consciousness", Papineau
- "Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain", Parfit
- "Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity and Morality", Parfit
- "Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity and Rationality", Parfit
- "Parfit (Derek) - The Closest Continuer Schema", Parfit
- "Peacocke (Arthur) & Gillett (Grant) - Persons and Personality: Introduction", Peacocke & Gillett
- "Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: Preface", Pollock
- "Quine (W.V.) - Two Dogmas of Empiricism", Quine
- "Roache (Rebecca) - A Defence of Quasi-Memory", Roache
- "Searle (John) - Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness", Searle
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics", Shoemaker
- "Shoemaker (David) - The Death of Derek Parfit", Shoemaker
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem", Snowdon
- "Sorensen (Roy) - Thought Experiments: Introduction", Sorensen
- "Strawson (Peter) - Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson", Strawson
- "Tye (Michael) - Qualia", Tye
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Précis of Material Beings", Van Inwagen
- "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time", Wiggins
- "Wiggins (David) - Preface: Sameness and Substance Renewed", Wiggins
- "Wiggins (David) - The Concern to Survive", Wiggins
- "Wiggins (David) - The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value", Wiggins
- "Wilkerson (T.E.) - Two Kinds of Metaphysics", Wilkerson
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Does God Know Our First-Person Perspectives?", Zimmerman
- A further reading list might start with:-
- "Baillie (James) - Aspects of Non-Reductionism", Baillie
- "Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Reductionism", Bennett & Hacker
- "Berglund (Stefan) - Identity and Reduction", Berglund … and
→ "Berglund (Stefan) - The Non-Reductive Personalist View"
→ "Berglund (Stefan) - Varieties of Reductive Personalism"
→ "Berglund (Stefan) - Problems of Reductive Personalism"
- "Cassam (Quassim) - Reductionism", Cassam
- "Chappell (Tim), Chappell (Sophie Grace) - Reductionism about Persons; And What Matters", Chappell
- "Dainton (Barry) - The Phenomenal Self: Appendix - Reductionism", Dainton
- "Franks Davis (Caroline) - The Reductionist Challenge", Franks Davis
- "Garrett (Brian) - Non-Reductionism and John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind", Garrett
- "Johnston (Mark) - Reasons and Reductionism", Johnston
- "Kim (Jaegwon) - Reduction and Reductionism: A New Look", Kim
- "Mills (Eugene) - Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity", Mills
- "Murphy (Nancey) - Did my neurons make me do it? Reductionism, morality and the problem of free will", Murphy
- "Murphy (Nancey) - Non-Reductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues", Murphy
- "Nagel (Ernest) - The Reduction of Theories", Nagel
- "Perrett (Roy W.) - Personal Identity, Minimalism, And Madhyamaka", Perrett
- "Rose (Steven) - Lifelines - Biology, Freedom, Determinism", Rose, Chapters 4 & 10
→ "Rose (Steven) - Précis of 'Lifelines: Biology, Freedom, Determinism'"
- "Rovane (Carol) - Branching Self-Consciousness", Rovane
- "Shoemaker (David) - The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductivism About Personal Identity", Shoemaker
- "Siderits (Mark) - Buddhist Reductionism", Siderits
- "Schaffer (Jonathan) - Causation and Laws of Nature: Reductionism", Schaffer
- "Slors (Marc) - Non-Reductionism, Epiphenominalism, and Eliminitivism: The Relevance of the Personal Identity Debate", Slors
- "Wimsatt (William) - Emergence as Non-Aggregativity and the Biases of Reductionisms", Wimsatt
- This is mostly a place-holder15.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (30/06/2020 00:11:31).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020