- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Semantics1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 27/06/2020 15:57:36): Semantics
- I need to separate those issues in the topic of personal identity that turn on matters of fact, and those that just depend on the meaning of our words.
- Sometimes, it is not clear which of these options is the case.
- For instance, David Wiggins’s view (shared with many others) that we should use the term PERSON4 of individuals that belong to a kind5 whose typical members have certain capacities will allow us to use the term of individuals who don’t presently possess these capacities. Then, if we accord certain rights to PERSONs in this sense, we may act differently to those who only confer the title PERSON to those with present capacities.
- So, there is a practical difference. But is this generated only by confusion over words? If that is what we mean by PERSON, then should we not then say that not all PERSONs have the same rights, and introduce a new term “PERSON-Plus” all of whose exemplars do deserve the rights?
- This will depend on whether PERSON is a natural kind6 concept7, and whether this kind strictly relates to PERSON or PERSON-Plus.
- For a Page of Links8 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read9, include the following:-
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- This is mostly a place-holder10. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (27/06/2020 15:57:36).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020