<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Todman (Theo) - Thesis - Sortals (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17887.htm">Thesis - Sortals</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Todman (Theo).htm">Todman (Theo)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17887.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">Sortals</A><SUP>1</SUP>' during my Thesis research, as from 2011. </li><li>For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17887_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17887_2"></A></u> (as at 08/05/2018 00:54:43): Sortals</B><BR><br><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17887_3">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17887_3"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Using Howard Robinson s terminology (<a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11924.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)</A>"), the <U>Ultimate Sort</U> of a thing is that <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_93.htm">property</A><SUP>4</SUP> without which the thing ceases to exist. </li><li>However, an individual falling under a <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">Phase Sortal</A><SUP>5</SUP> can lose the property that defines the phase without ceasing to exist. </li><li>Ultimate Sorts are presumably the same as <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_869.htm">Baker</A><SUP>6</SUP> s <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_80.htm">Primary Kinds</A><SUP>7</SUP>, though I can t remember if she has an analogue of a Phase Sortal. </li><li>The standard example is of a <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">Human Being</A><SUP>8</SUP> (as the Ultimate Sort) and Child (as a Phase Sortal). </li><li>So, is <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">personhood</A><SUP>9</SUP> an attribute of a human being, like  childhood , that a human being can either possess or lack, or are persons <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_8.htm">ontologically</A><SUP>10</SUP> separate from  their human beings? </li><li><a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_109.htm">Wiggins</A><SUP>11</SUP> argues that we can t talk of the <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Secure_Jen/Notes_7/Notes_728.htm">persistence conditions</A><SUP>12</SUP> of anything until we know what sort it is. </li><li>Olson claims that it s futile to talk of the persistence conditions of persons per se  if human beings, God and angels are all persons  since their persistence conditions (assuming the existence of God and angels, for the sake of the argument) are completely different. This lack of a common set of persistence conditions would indicate that <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">Person</A><SUP>13</SUP> is not an Ultimate Sort. </li><li>I (intend to) discuss the sorts that <U>we</U> may fall under in the Note on  <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">What are We</A><SUP>14</SUP> .</li><li>For a page of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17887_15">Links</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17887_15"></A> to this Note, <a href="Notes_10_Links.htm">Click here</a>.</li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17887_16">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17887_16"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17887_17">include</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17887_17"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5108.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts</A>", Baillie</li><li><a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A>", Baillie</li><li><a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3706.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Sortals</A>", Hirsch</li><li><a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>", Olson</li><li><a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5138.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities</A>", Wilson</li><li><a name="20"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5144.htm">Wilson (Jack) - Identity and Sortals: Why Relative Identity Is Self-Contradictory</A>", Wilson</li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="21"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22818.htm">Baldwin (Thomas) - Reviews: Sameness and Substance by David Wiggins; Objects and Identity by Harold Noonan</A>", Baldwin</li><li><a name="22"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4461.htm">Bennett (Daniel) - Essential Properties</A>", Bennett</li><li><a name="23"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8441.htm">Bennett (Karen) - Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem</A>", Bennett</li><li><a name="24"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6075.htm">Berglund (Stefan) - Identity and Reduction</A>", Berglund</li><li><a name="25"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_23/Abstract_23009.htm">Braddon-Mitchell (David) & Miller (Kristie) - Talking about a Universalist World</A>", Braddon-Mitchell</li><li><a name="26"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3947.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Stages, Sortals, and Possible Worlds</A>", Brennan</li><li><a name="27"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7324.htm">Burke (Michael) - Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem</A>", Burke</li><li><a name="28"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2011.htm">Burke (Michael) - Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Amongst Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions</A>", Burke</li><li><a name="29"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7169.htm">Campbell (John) - Sortals and the Binding Problem</A>", Campbell</li><li><a name="30"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5885.htm">Carter (William) - On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms</A>", Carter</li><li><a name="31"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4948.htm">Cocchiarella (Nino) - On the Logic of Natural Kinds</A>", Cocchiarella</li><li><a name="32"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5500.htm">Feldman (Fred) - Sortal Predicates</A>", Feldman</li><li><a name="33"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6250.htm">Griffin (Nicholas) - Sortals</A>", Griffin</li><li><a name="34"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5396.htm">Hawley (Katherine) - Sheer Coincidence?</A>", Hawley</li><li><a name="35"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3430.htm">Hughes (Christopher) - Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts</A>", Hughes</li><li><a name="50"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6411.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17887_18">Lowe</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17887_18"></A>, especially:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="36"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21745.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Individuals, Sorts, and Instantiation</A>", Lowe</li><li><a name="37"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4463.htm">Mackie (Penelope) - Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties</A>", Mackie</li><li><a name="38"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5039.htm">Oderberg (David) - Coincidence Under a Sortal</A>", Oderberg</li><li><a name="39"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14525.htm">Runggaldier (Edmund) - Sortal Continuity of Material Things</A>", Runggaldier<BR>&rarr; <a name="40"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14526.htm">Rapp (Christof) - Runggaldier on the Cohabitation of Material Objects</A>", Rapp</li><li><a name="41"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15879.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence</A>", Shoemaker</li><li><a name="42"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11355.htm">Stevenson (Leslie) - A formal theory of sortal quantification</A>", Stevenson</li><li><a name="43"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19951.htm">Stone (Jim) - Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus's Puzzle</A>", Stone</li><li><a name="44"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9775.htm">Ujvari (Marta) - Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism</A>", Ujvari</li><li><a name="51"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17887_19">Wiggins</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17887_19"></A>, especially<BR>&rarr; <a name="45"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3501.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: and the Characteristic Activity or Function or Purpose of their Compliants</A>"</li><li><a name="46"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22772.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu</A>", Wiggins</li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">place-holder</A><SUP>20</SUP>. </li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P17887_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17887_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (08/05/2018 00:54:43). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17887_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17887_3"><B>Footnote 3</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17887_15"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17887_15"><B>Footnote 15</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>If only a  non-updating run has been made, the links are only one-way  ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven t yet been confirmed as relevant. </li><li>Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the  Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note and  Summary of Note Links to this Page sections) are to the  point of link within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the  links page remain generic. </li><li>There are two sorts of updating runs  for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17887_16"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17887_16"><B>Footnote 16</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17887_17"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17887_17"><B>Footnote 17</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17887_18"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17887_18"><B>Footnote 18</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe no need, therefore, to look at <a name="52"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_640.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms</A>", though I ve read:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="47"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20013.htm">Baur (Michael) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", <BR>&rarr; <a name="48"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20012.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>", and<BR>&rarr; <a name="49"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20011.htm">Simons (Peter) - Review of 'Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms' by E. J. Lowe</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17887_19"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17887_19"><B>Footnote 19</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>No need to read Wiggins s earlier work in detail? </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-13T13:22" pubdate>13/08/2018 13:22:44</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>