- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Substance1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 08/06/2020 14:32:38): Substance
- This is a big subject but, basically, I take a substance to be an individual (relatively) self-standing thing (a particular) that has properties that may change over time.
- My specific interest in this topic is whether persons – qua persons4 – are substances. This depends what the term “person” refers to. My contention is that “person” is a property (or collection of properties, or an honorific) of a substance rather than a substance in its own right. So, animalism5 would have it that the substance is the human animal6, which for part of its existence has the property of being a person.
- There’s the question whether the substance-view is inconsistent with perdurantism7, whereby individuals are not wholly present at a time, but are “space-time worms”. On this view, for an animalist, a person would be a section (or a collection of sections) of the space-time worm that is the human animal.
- Maybe on either view, a person is a phase sortal8 of the human animal.
- I intend to cover this topic amongst other general metaphysical matters in Chapter 49 of my Thesis.
- For a Page of Links10 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read11 include the following:-
- "Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons", Cassam
- "Crane (Tim) - Substance (4-Lecture BA Course)", Crane
- "Kurtz (Roxanne) - Introduction to Persistence: What’s the Problem?", Kurtz12
- "Moreland (J.P.) & Rae (Scott) - Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things", Moreland & Rae
- "Olson (Eric) - Persistence", Olson
- "Vieira (Celso) - Which is more fundamental: processes or things?", Vieira
- "Wiggins (David) - Preface: Sameness and Substance Renewed", Wiggins
- "Wikipedia - Hylomorphism", Wikipedia
- "Woolhouse (Roger) - Leibniz and Substance", Woolhouse13
- "Woolhouse (Roger) - Spinoza and Substance", Woolhouse14=13
- The study-list for this topic (restricted to Personal Identity) would include:-
- "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Substance (Part 1)", Anscombe
- "Ayers (Michael R.) - Part I: Substance and Mode", Ayers
- "Ayers (Michael R.) - Substance: Prolegomena to a Realist Theory of Identity", Ayers
- "Broackes (Justin) - Substance", Broakes
- "Broackes (Justin) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Substance: Things and Stuffs", Broakes & Hacker
- "Butchvarov (Panayot) - Substances", Butchvarov
- "Campbell (Scott) - Persons and Substances", Campbell
- "Carter (William) - Substance", Carter
- "Hacker (P.M.S.) - Substance: The Constitution of Reality", Hacker
- "Hamlyn (D.W.) - Substance", Hamlyn
- "Hamlyn (D.W.) - Simple Substances: Monism and Pluralism", Hamlyn
- "Hasker (William) - Persons as Emergent Substances", Hasker
- "Hershenov (David) - Olson's Account of Function and Substance Concepts", Hershenov
- "Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Substance: Its Nature and Existence", Hoffman & Rosenkrantz
- "Korner (Stephan) - Substance (Part 2)", Korner
- "Koslicki (Kathrin) - In Defense of Substance", Koslicki
- "Lizza (John) - Persons as Substances", Lizza
- "Loux (Michael) - Beyond Substrata and Bundles: A Prolegomenon to a Substance Ontology", Loux
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Introduction to Substance", Lowe
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Locke: Substance", Lowe
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Persistence and Substance", Lowe
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Substance and Dependence", Lowe
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Substance, Identity and Time", Lowe
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Substance and Selfhood", Lowe
- "Lowe (E.J.) - The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time", Lowe
- "Noonan (Harold) - Substance, Identity and Time", Noonan
- "Olson (Eric) - A Compound of Two Substances", Olson
- "Reck (Andrew) - Substance and Chisholm's Concept of the Person", Reck
- "Robinson (Howard) - Substance", Robinson
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Are Selves Substances?", Shoemaker
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self and Substance", Shoemaker
- "Simons (Peter) - Farewell to Substance: A Differentiated Leave-Taking", Simons
- "Toner (Patrick) - Emergent Substance", Toner
- "Toner (Patrick) - Independence accounts of substance and substantial parts", Toner
- "Toner (Patrick) - Transubstantiation, essentialism, and substance", Toner15
- "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed", Wiggins16
- "Wiggins (David) - Substance", Wiggins
- "Woolhouse (Roger) - Descartes and Substance", Woolhouse17
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Review of Hoffman & Rosenkrantz's 'Substance: Its Nature and Existence'", Zimmerman
- This is mostly a place-holder18.
Footnote 12: Footnotes 13, 14:
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (08/06/2020 14:32:38).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- This looks of tangential interest, but as I’ve gone to considerable trouble to analyse the paper, I might as well include it!
Footnote 16: Footnote 17:
- If Toner thinks he can defend Transubstantiation there must be something about his theory of Substance.
- As I’ve written up the chapters on Leibniz and Spinoza, I ought at least to read the one on Descartes!
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020