<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Todman (Theo) - Thesis - Vague Identity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17904.htm">Thesis - Vague Identity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Todman (Theo).htm">Todman (Theo)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_17/PaperSummary_17904.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_106.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><ul type="disc"><li>This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_106.htm">Vague Identity</A><SUP>1</SUP>' during my Thesis research, as from 2011. </li><li>For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17904_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17904_2"></A></u> (as at 17/01/2018 13:43:41): Vague Identity</B><BR><br><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17904_3">Plug Note</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17904_3"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li> The orthodox approach to the <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">Logic of Identity</A><SUP>4</SUP> is to treat it as a necessary equivalence relation. I follow this approach. </li><li>However, in response to various <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</A><SUP>5</SUP>, deviant <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17904_6">forms</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17904_6"></A> of Identity have been devised, and some are still popular. </li><li>However, the logic of identity is so secure that it is sensible to look for other explanations of any TE that appears to bring it into doubt.</li><li>Two seemingly related suggestions are Vague Identity (VI, this Note) and <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1261.htm">Indeterminate Identity</A><SUP>7</SUP> (II). </li><li>I m not sure of the distinction between VI and II, having studied neither in any detail, but:- <ol type="i"><li>I d have thought that VI is a metaphysical claim alongside the suggestion  allegedly refuted by Evans  that there can be vague objects. </li><li>In contrast to this, II sounds like an epistemological claim  that there are identity claims the truth-values of which we cannot know. </li><li>The above distinction is somewhat moot if the puzzle of <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_122.htm">Vagueness</A><SUP>8</SUP> is seen as at root epistemological, as by <a name="20"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/W/Author_Williamson (Timothy).htm">Timothy Williamson</A>. </li><li>To make matters worse, there are at least two other terms used:- <BR>&rarr;  Indefinite Identity , and<BR>&rarr;  Imperfect Identity <BR>Both these terms sound metaphysical, so I ve assumed (for now) that they are the same as  Vague Identity . </li></ol></li><li>However, a quick look through the abstract of the papers on the reading lists suggests that the two notions are related  in that papers titled as related to one actually seem to relate to the other. Parsons s book below looks like a good study of the whole topic but uses II to mean <u>indeterminacy in the world</u>, which is a metaphysical claim. </li><li>I intend to cover these topics in <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1016.htm">Chapter 4</A><SUP>9</SUP> along with the other deviant approaches to Identity. </li><li>Works on this topic that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17904_10">I ve actually read</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17904_10"></A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17904_11">include</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17904_11"></A> the following:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_443.htm">Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?</A>", Evans</li><li><a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3744.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Identity and Vagueness</A>", Garrett</li><li><a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7170.htm">Hossack (Keith) - Vagueness and Personal Identity</A>", Hossack</li><li><a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6987.htm">Olson (Eric) - Imperfect Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P17904_12">Olson</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P17904_12"></A></li></ol></li><li>A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:- <ol type="i"><li><a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12994.htm">Broome (John) - Indefiniteness in Identity</A>", Broome</li><li><a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15876.htm">Burgess (J.A.) - Vague Objects and Indefinite Identity</A>", Burgess</li><li><a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11678.htm">Edgington (Dorothy) - Williamson on Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Edgington</li><li><a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13007.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Vagueness and Identity</A>", Garrett</li><li><a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21933.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy</A>", Lowe</li><li><a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13008.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Vague Identity Yet Again</A>", Noonan</li><li><a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3550.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Vagueness of Identity</A>", Van Inwagen</li><li><a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11611.htm">Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz's Law</A>", Williamson<BR> </li></ol></li><li>This is mostly a <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_737.htm">place-holder</A><SUP>13</SUP>. Currently, just see the categorised reading-list. </li></ul><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P17904_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17904_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (17/01/2018 13:43:41). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_106.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17904_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17904_3"><B>Footnote 3</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>A number of my philosophical Notes are  promissory notes currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned. </li><li>I ve decided to add some text  whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive  for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.</li><li>As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance. </li><li>The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17904_6"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17904_6"><B>Footnote 6</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure if this is the correct terminology. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17904_10"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17904_10"><B>Footnote 10</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Frequently I ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note. </li><li>In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time. </li><li>In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course. </li><li>My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P17904_11"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17904_11"><B>Footnote 11</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I may have read others in between updates of this Note  in which case they will be marked as such in the  References and Reading List below.</li><li>Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P17904_12"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P17904_12"><B>Footnote 12</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It looks like Olson uses  imperfect as an amalgamated metaphysical / epistemological claim. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-13T13:23" pubdate>13/08/2018 13:23:23</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>