- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Zombies1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 17/08/2018 17:35:31): Zombies
- This topic – really a TE4 – properly belongs to the philosophy of mind5 and consciousness studies6.
- It is covered in "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture III", and is a bug-bear of David Papineau – eg. in the latter part of "Papineau (David) - The Importance of Philosophical Intuition".
- It is a term of art for the supposed possibility that individuals might exist with exactly the same
→ physical structure and
as human persons, but without phenomenal consciousness – with “no-one at home”, in other words.
- The most important claim in the first – that beings of the same physical structure as ourselves might lack consciousness. Accepting it seems to beg the question against materialism. If materialism is true, then zombies are impossible – on the assumption that we are conscious7.
- The second – that androids (say) might behave like us but lack consciousness is readily believed by all those not in thrall to8 a strong version of Strong AI and the Turing Test.
- This doesn’t mean that “zombies” don’t have minds, or that they blunder about as in the horror movies – they would appear completely like us. It’s just that there’s nothing it is like to be a zombie. Or so it is supposed. It may be that this is in fact impossible.
- What has all this got to do with Personal Identity? Some immediate thoughts:-
- There would seem to be no impact on animalism9, which discounts the importance of the mental for our persistence.
- The constitution view10 might equally be unperturbed. This depends on whether zombies have a FPP11. As noted, they have a mind, and presumably intentionality – a window on the world. But I suspect therre needs to be something it’s like to have a FPP.
- Consciousness is often said to be something essential to being a person12.
- For a page of Links13 to this Note, Click here. Unfortunately, there are too many links to process at the moment.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read14, include15 the following:-
- "Crane (Tim) - Consciousness", Section 29 (See this Note16), Crane.
- "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture III", Kripke
- "Moody (Todd C.) - Conversations with Zombies", Moody
- "Papineau (David) - The Importance of Philosophical Intuition", Papineau
- "Tye (Michael) - Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can?", Tye
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Bermudez (Jose Luis) - Review of Robert Kirk's 'Zombies and Consciousness'", Bermudez
- "Dennett (Daniel) - The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies: Commentary on Moody, Flanagan, and Polger", Dennett
- "Flanagan (Owen) & Polger (Thomas) - Zombies and the Function of Consciousness", Flanagan & Polger
- "Kirk (Robert) - Reply to Don Locke on Zombies and Materialism", Kirk
- "Kirk (Robert) - The Inconceivability of Zombies", Kirk
- "Kirk (Robert) - Why There Couldn't Be Zombies", Kirk
- "Kirk (Robert) - Zombies", Kirk
- "Kirk (Robert) - Zombies versus Materialists (I)", Kirk
- "Locke (Don) - Zombies, Schizophrenics, and Purely Physical Objects", Locke
- "Papineau (David) - The Impossibility of Zombies", Papineau
- "Polger (Thomas) - Zombies", Polger
- "Polger (Thomas) - Zombies Explained", Polger
- "Squires (J.E.R.) - Zombies versus Materialists (II)", Squires
- "Stalnaker (Robert) - What Is It Like To Be a Zombie?", Stalnaker
- "Sturgeon (Scott) - Zombies and Ghosts", Sturgeon.
- This is mostly a place-holder17.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (17/08/2018 17:35:31).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 7: Footnote 8: This claim needs justification. See the general disclaimer.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- If only a “non-updating” run has been made, the links are only one-way – ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven’t yet been confirmed as relevant.
- Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” and “Summary of Note Links to this Page” sections) are to the “point of link” within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the “links page” remain generic.
- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019