<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_18/PaperSummary_18375.htm">'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/J/Author_Johnston (Mark).htm">Johnston (Mark)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_18/PaperSummary_18375.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_18/PaperCitings_18375.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_18/PapersToNotes_18375.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Introduction</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Twenty years ago  in <a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>" and elsewhere  I defended an alternative methodology for arriving at an answer to the question: <em>What kind captures our essence and so determines our conditions of survival over time?</em></li><li>Previously, when it came to philosophical theorising about personal identity, the popular methodology   the method of cases  had been to collect  intuitions about real and imaginary cases of personal survival and ceasing to be, and then bring these intuitions into some sort of reflective equilibrium that bore on the question of the necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary person s survival. Imagined cases were treated as more or less on a par with real cases; for the then natural idea was that we should not restrict our evidence base to the adventitious experiments of step-motherly nature, when we could also avail ourselves of the ingenious <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>1</SUP> in the philosophy journals. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Notes</u> (By <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P18375_2">Section</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P18375_2"></A>)<ol type="1"><li><b>Section</b>:See above: sets the scene as the investigation of the method of  cases in answering the question  what kind are we? .</li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li>Reasons for rejecting the  method of cases & </li><li>The <b>first</b> is that the necessary conditions of our survival  arising from our common essence  are not open to a priori armchair reflection. Knowledge of our real essence is not necessary for semantic <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P18375_3">competence</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P18375_3"></A> in the use of  (same) person . Philosophy has moved on from conceptual analysis ( advanced lexicography ) to seeking the real definition of the item in question. </li><li>So, what is  real definition ? We want to know  what it is to be that item  this involves using all the relevant knowledge  much of it a posteriori knowledge  and all our  argumentative ingenuity .</li><li>Johnston <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P18375_4">returns</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P18375_4"></A> to this topic to demonstrate the viability of the method of real definition. </li><li>Real definition is, however, <u>not</u> inherently at odds with conceptual analysis because concepts are themselves subject to real definition. </li><li>We can all agree that possessors of a concept must at least implicitly understand its conditions of application. </li><li>The <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P18375_5">exception</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P18375_5"></A> is where there is deference  either to experts or reality itself  to settle the extension of a concept. </li><li>Johnston makes an analogy  in the case where deference is to  reality itself  between water and human persons. In the case of water, we start off with our partial understanding of the concept and try to determine the real definition  just what is it to be water, and how do its manifest qualities enter into its real definition. Are they just <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P18375_6">contingent</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P18375_6"></A>, or essential like its chemical composition?</li><li>Then, completing the analogy, <b>if</b> we defer to reality in our concept of personal identity, we should address its real definition. However, the defender of the method of cases may say that we aren t deferring to experts in the case of persons, as we all know what persons are. </li><li>In <a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston argued that our concept of  person is  highly determinable  ie. without much content, as is shown by two considerations. </li><li>The <b>first</b> is the various and conflicting theoretical, ideological or theological elaborations of the concept. </li><li>The <b>second</b> is the consideration that our intuitions lead us to consider a person as a  Bare <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P18375_7">Locus</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P18375_7"></A> of mental life that can  in principle  survive any amount of physical or psychological discontinuity. </li><li> </li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li>The <b>second</b> reason & </li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li><li><b>Section</b>:<ul type="disc"><li></li></ul></li></ol><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Part I: Symposium - Human Beings,</li><li>Response to <a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_18/Abstract_18374.htm">Robinson (Denis) - Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival</A>", </li><li>See <a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>" for the original paper. </li></ul><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P18375_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P18375_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: Ie.  n. Section corresponds to  Section n of the text. <a name="On-Page_Link_P18375_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P18375_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>We can talk competently about things that don t exist  souls, or unicorns  which  when we really dig into the concept  are a bit vague; so, in a sense, we don t know what we are talking about. </li><li>So, this competence doesn t mean that we necessarily know what we are talking about.</li><li>Likewise, we can competently talk about things that do exist  persons  without really knowing what it is we re talking about. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P18375_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P18375_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: Ie. from <a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P18375_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P18375_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: Johnston doesn t put it quite like this but this is what I  at least for now  take him as saying. <a name="On-Page_Link_P18375_6"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P18375_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not quite sure what he has in mind. </li><li>We are, however, referred to <a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20382.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Manifest Kinds</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P18375_7"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P18375_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The  Bare element inclines us to think of a <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">haecceity</a>, but the  mental life gives it properties. </li><li>This sounds, therefore, something like Baker s <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">FPP</a>. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T08:53" pubdate>02/08/2018 08:53:43</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>