Worlds, Pluriverses, and Minds
Heller (Mark)
Source: Zimmerman (Dean), Ed. - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Over the last few years I have been developing an ontology of ersatz possible worlds based on some suggestive ideas made by "Quine (W.V.) - Propositional Objects". The proposed account identifies worlds with complicated sets that represent distributions of fundamental properties across a manifold. I will henceforth call this view “Representationalism”. The purpose of the present chapter is twofold:-
    • First, I want to consider how this picture of worlds must be developed in order to accommodate the possibility of manifolds that are not connected with one another or only partially connected with one another.
    • Secondly, I want to consider how this picture of worlds must be developed in order to accommodate the possibility of non-physical minds
    The relation between these two projects is that I will propose that non-physical minds can be treated as collections of mental properties distributed in separate manifolds each of which is partially connected to the manifold in which the physical properties are distributed.
  2. I begin is Section I with an account of the Representationalist theory of worlds. In Section II, I extend the theory to include disconnected and partially connected manifolds. In addition, this section will serve to clarify a challenge to David Lewis’s modal1 realism ("Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds"). Section III will explore the way minds can fit into this picture of worlds.

Comment:

Part II: Modalit2y

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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