- Often cited in defense of four-dimensionalism about the persistence of material objects is its treatment of the so-called puzzles of coincidence. These puzzles include the statue/lump1, the ship of Theseus2, Tibbles the cat3 and the various fission and fusion puzzles in the personal identity literature. In their original versions, the puzzles involve changes which either seem to produce or terminate coincidence between material objects (the lump is flattened, the cat’s tail is cut off, etc.), but each of the puzzles also has a modal4 variant in which the relevant change could have occurred but does not. Four-dimensionalists (4Dists) standardly take themselves to have an edge over three-dimensionalists (3Dists) in the treatment of these puzzles. They claim that the original puzzles are answered easily and painlessly under 4Dism, and that their modal5 variants can be answered by something like counterpart theory. By contrast6, they claim, 3Dists have no easy way with the originals, and no better way with the modal7 variants.
- My aim here is to determine whether this is correct. I will argue that it is not, and that the puzzles are every bit as challenging for the 4Dist as they are for the 3Dist. In a final section, I will tentatively suggest that reflecting on the puzzles may provide a reason to reject 4Dism.
Part III: Coincident Objects and Temporal Parts
Footnote 6: McGrath has a footnote to the effect that both 4Dists and 3Dists are in agreement, and quotes the following:-
- "Burke (Michael) - Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Amongst Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions",
- "Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist",
- "Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter",
- "Heller (Mark) - Temporal Overlap Is Not Coincidence",
- "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity",
- "Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds",
- "Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity",
- "Rea (Michael) - Material Constitution: Preface, Introduction & Appendix (A Formal Statement of the Problem)",
- "Rea (Michael) - Supervenience and Co-Location", Section 4 – more sceptical,
- "Sider (Ted) - All the World's a Stage",
- "Sider (Ted) - Four-Dimensionalism",
- "Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time".
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)