Identity, Quantification and Number
Olson (Eric)
Source: T. Tahko, ed., Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press 2012: 66-82
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Author’s Abstract

    E. J. Lowe and others argue that there can be 'uncountable' things admitting of no numerical description. This implies that there can be something without there being at least one such thing, and that things can be identical without being one or non-identical without being two. The clearest putative example of uncountable things is portions of homogeneous stuff or 'gunk'. The paper argues that there is a number of portions of gunk if there is any gunk at all, and that the possibility of uncountable things is inadequately supported.

  1. The quantification and identity principles
  2. The uncountability thesis
  3. Portions of stuff
  4. Arguments for the uncountability of portions
  5. the countability of portions
  6. Numerical and quasi-numerical descriptions
  7. The number of things


See Link.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - June 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page