The Person and the Corpse
Olson (Eric)
Source: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death; ed. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (OUP, 2015), pp. 80-96
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    What happens to us when we die, if there is no afterlife1? We might cease to exist, or continue existing as corpses. The view that we become corpses is hard to defend, because it makes it hard to say what our identity over time could consist in. The view that we cease to exist is little better: it seems to imply that there are no such things as corpses. A satisfying metaphysics of death is elusive.

Sections
  1. The Person and the Corpse
  2. Pluralism
  3. Speaking of the Dead
  4. The Person/Body Argument
  5. The Essentialism Argument
  6. The Psychological-Continuity Argument
  7. The Dead-Animal Argument
  8. Animals and Corpses
  9. The Annihilationist’s Dilemma
  10. Animal Identity
  11. The Historic-Dependence Account
  12. Ttoubles for Historic Dependence
  13. Pluralism and Corpse Eliminitivism

Comment:

Annotated printout in "Olson (Eric) - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson)". Link.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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