The Same Body Again? Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity of the Resurrected Body
Niederbacher (Bruno)
Source: Gasser (Georg) - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? 2010
Paper - Abstract

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    Niederbacher discusses Thomas Aquinas’s influential teaching about bodily resurrection. Apparently there are two rival views in Aquinas's teaching, one more materialist, the other more dualist. The materialist says: what makes for the numerical identity2 of the body is that some elemental parts of which the body is composed during the earthly life will be part of the resurrected body. The dualist says: what makes for the numerical identity3 of the body is nothing other than the substantial form. Whenever the substantial form is embodied, this body will be of its flesh. Niederbacher argues that Aquinas should opt for the "dualist" view, in order to maintain the consistency of his overall account and to meet systematic objections.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: From the Introduction by Georg Gasser

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