The Metaphysics of Hyperspace: Introduction
Hudson (Hud)
Source: Hudson (Hud) - The Metaphysics of Hyperspace, Introduction
Paper - Abstract

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Contents

  1. On classical logic and neighboring matters
  2. On material objects
  3. On substantivalism
  4. On relations to regions
  5. On composition and decomposition
  6. On simples and gunk
  7. On persistence and change
  8. On eternalism
  9. On modality1 and recombination
  10. On vagueness
  11. On bruteness
  12. On intuitions
  13. On theism
  14. On hyperspace and topology

Notes
  1. On classical logic and neighboring matters
  2. On material objects
    • Hudson accepts Realism concerning many types of abstract and concrete objects. He notes that "Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds", Section 1.7 “Concreteness” shows the difficulty of distinguishing the two.
    • Abstracta: Hudson is a realist9 about numbers, functions, sets, classes, propositions, properties, relations and states of affairs.
    • Concreta: Hudson is a realist about spacetime, material substances10, events, holes, and at least one immaterial substance11.
    • Hudson adopts the Occupancy Account of material objects. It is analytic that a material object is “an object each of whose parts occupies a region of spacetime12”.
    • Hudson rejects Descartes’s “extension” account of material objects as it would imply that point-objects aren’t material.
  3. On substantivalism
  4. On relations to regions
  5. On composition and decomposition
  6. On simples and gunk
  7. On persistence and change
  8. On eternalism
  9. On modality13 and recombination
  10. On vagueness
  11. On bruteness
  12. On intuitions
  13. On theism
  14. On hyperspace and topology



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2: What is this, and what’s Lewis’s problem?

Footnote 3: I don’t have much by him (Graham Priest), but "Jackson (Frank) & Priest (Graham), Eds. - Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis" was on my list to read when proposing to treat of David Lewis for my MPhil (though GP is only the editor).

Footnote 5: So, does he allow Relative Identity?

Footnote 6: So, presumably, VI invokes relative identity to address this Trinitarian statement from the Athanasian Creed.

Footnote 7: What’s Van Inwagen’s angle here? Examples?

Footnote 8: Why is a discussion necessary?

Footnote 9: Do I agree? What does realism with respect to abstracta imply?

Footnote 10: I had thought there was a conflict between 4-dimensionalism and substances. Maybe he just means “matter”?

Footnote 11: God?

Footnote 12: Note “time” – so material objects are temporally extended.


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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