As Good As It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction
Hanley (Richard)
Source: Jackson - Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Chapter 9
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract & Introduction

  1. David Lewis's approach to analysing truth in fiction, significantly amended by 'Postscripts' in 1983 ("Lewis (David) - Truth in Fiction"), has been widely criticized on three main grounds, and it seems fair to say that nearly every writer on the subject thinks that one of these grounds is sufficient to show that Lewis is mistaken. I argue that with some minor revision, Lewis's approach survives all extant objections. Indeed, I judge the Lewis approach to be even more successful than Lewis himself seems to think.
  2. David Lewis offers a way to analyse what is true in a fiction [1983]. More precisely, Lewis offers an approach, and gives two distinct but related analyses, remaining resolutely neutral on which of the two is more correct, and maintaining that neither analysis is completely correct as it stands. I shall defend the Lewis approach in the face of objections from Alex Byrne, Gregory Currie, Michael Gettings, Robin LePoidevin, John Phillips, Graham Priest, and David Lewis himself

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