Modal Realism with Overlap
McDaniel (Kris)
Source: Jackson - Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Chapter 12
Paper - Abstract

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    In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal1 realism with overlap , the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism , which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal2 analogue of endurantism3 , which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located.


Originally Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 82, Number 1, March 01, 2004, pp. 137-152(16)

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