Modal Realism with Overlap
McDaniel (Kris)
Source: Jackson - Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Chapter 12
Paper - Abstract

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    In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal1 realism with overlap , the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism , which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal2 analogue of endurantism3 , which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located.

Comment:

Originally Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 82, Number 1, March 01, 2004, pp. 137-152(16)

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