The Identity Of Indiscernibles And The Principle Of No Co-Location
Casati (Roberto) & Torrengo (Giuliano)
Source: Retrieved from, Sept. 2013
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    In this paper, we propose a revised version of Black’s1 original argument against the principle of identity of indiscernibles2. Our aim is to examine a puzzle regarding the intuitiveness of arguments, by showing that the revised version is clearly less intuitive than Black’s original one, and appears to be unjustified by our ordinary means of assessment of intuitions.


Penultimate draft - to appear in Realism and Ontology Without Myths, Cambridge Scholars). Posted on Link, September 2013.

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: See "Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles". A discussion of Leibniz’s Laws will appear under Leibniz (Click here for Note), though currently there’s only a reading list.

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