Tooley’s Solution to the Inference Problem
Sider (Ted)
Source: Philosophical Studies 67 (1992): 261–75
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. In response to various shortcomings of regularity theories of natural law, some philosophers of a realist bent have recently been drawn to the view that a law of nature is a relation between universals1. Heading this group are Michael Tooley and D. M. Armstrong.
  2. The view that laws are relations between universals2 may have great theoretical promise, but it faces a problem of its own. Surely, if it is a law of nature that Fs are Gs then it follows that all Fs are Gs. But for views like those of Armstrong and Tooley this entailment seems to be a mystery. In this paper I discuss Tooley’s attempt in his recent book Causation3 to solve what has become known as the “inference problem”.

Comment:

See Link.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3: Not to be confused with "Sosa (Ernest) & Tooley (Michael), Eds. - Causation".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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