Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument
Sider (Ted)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 613–24
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryNotes Citing this Paper

Author’s Abstract

    Statues and lumps of clay are said by some to coincide — to be numerically distinct despite being made up of the same parts. They are said to be numerically distinct because they differ modally. Coincident objects would be non-modally indiscernible, and thus appear to violate the supervenience1 of modal properties on nonmodal properties. But coincidence and supervenience2 are in fact consistent if the most fundamental modal features are not properties, but are rather relations that are symmetric as between coincident entities, relations such as “opposite-possibly surviving being squashed”.


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