Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument
Sider (Ted)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 613–24
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Author’s Abstract

    Statues1 and lumps of clay are said by some to coincide — to be numerically distinct despite being made up of the same parts. They are said to be numerically distinct because they differ modally2. Coincident objects would be non-modally3 indiscernible, and thus appear to violate the supervenience4 of modal5 properties on nonmodal6 properties. But coincidence and supervenience7 are in fact consistent if the most fundamental modal8 features are not properties, but are rather relations that are symmetric as between coincident entities, relations such as “opposite-possibly surviving being squashed”.

Comment:

See Link.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Nov 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page