Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism
Rodriguez-Pereyra (Gonzalo)
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 113, No. 452 (Oct., 2004), pp. 683-704
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. In this paper I argue that Modal1 Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism2, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists3. Modal4 Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism5.
  2. In the paper I argue that Modal6 Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism7. Such a modification makes Modal8 Realism neither incur further theoretical costs nor lose its theoretical benefits. Thus such a modification constitutes an improvement of Modal9 Realism.

In-Page Footnotes

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