The Identity Theory of Truth
Candlish (Stewart) & Damnjanovic (Nic)
Source: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 1996-2010
Paper - Abstract

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    The simplest and most general statement of the identity theory of truth is that when a truth-bearer (e.g., a proposition) is true, there is a truthmaker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truthmaker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture the reality they are about and thus fall short of the truth we aim at. An identity theory is designed to overcome this suspicion.

Table of Contents
  1. Motivations and Sources
  2. Judgments and Reality
    … 2.1 Pushing judgments towards reality
    … 2.2 Pushing reality towards judgments
  3. Propositions and Facts
    … 3.1 Pushing propositions towards facts
    … 3.2 Pushing facts towards propositions
    … 3.3 Disjunctivism1
  4. Quietism
  5. Bibliography
    … Academic Tools
    … Other Internet Resources
    … Related Entries


See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: The Identity Theory of Truth. First published Thu Mar 28, 1996; substantive revision Thu Jan 13, 2011

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