<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Hawley (Katherine) - David Lewis on Persistence (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19956.htm">David Lewis on Persistence</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hawley (Katherine).htm">Hawley (Katherine)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: St. Andrews' Website; forthcoming for Blackwell Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19956.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperCitings_19956.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PapersToNotes_19956.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Opening & Closing Paragraphs</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>To persist is to exist at more than one time, to transcend the momentary. How do things achieve this? We might answer with talk of thermodynamic stability, molecular bonds, photosynthesis, the porcupine s spines, German manufacturing standards, legal protection of ancient monuments, or the uncanny ability of children to extract care from their parents. In Lewis s terms, such answers explain the existence of spatiotemporal and qualitative continuities over time in causal terms, by reference either to the causal mechanisms which directly underpin such continuities, or to their preconditions and external circumstances. Explanations may differ according to the kind of object in question: German washing machines and yew-trees are both long-lasting, relative to other types of appliance or tree respectively, but the reasons for their longevity are quite different.</li><li>The metaphysicians have a further question about persistence, a question which is expected to have the same answer for all sorts of concrete objects. What is it for something to exist at more than one time? For Lewis, a thing exists at more than one time by having distinct stages, each of which is located at a different time. These stages are parts of the persisting object: added together, they are the persisting object. On this view, persistence through time is analogous to extension through space: a spatially-extended object occupies more than one point at a single time by having different spatial parts located at different places. Likewise, for Lewis, a temporally extended object occupies more than one time by having different temporal parts located at different times.  Persisting particulars consist of temporal parts, united by various kinds of continuity. </li><li>The intended contrast is the view that concrete things  endure identically through time , as <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP> do if they exist. <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> are wholly located where their instances are: the universal <em>having mass 1kg</em> is entirely present in each of the 1kg bags of flour on the supermarket shelf, and that very same universal will be present in future bags of flour, just as it was in past bags of flour. The universal does not portion itself out, a part here and now, a part there and then: instead, the whole universal is in each place it is needed. In the same way, an enduring concrete thing, if such there be, would not portion itself out over time, a stage then and a stage now: instead, the whole persisting object is located at each time of its existence. </li><li>Following Lewis (who credits Mark Johnston), these rival views of persistence are now known as  perdurance theory and  endurance theory respectively: <ul type="disc"><BR>Let us say that something <em>persists</em> iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something <em>perdures</em> iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it <em>endures</em> iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. Perdurance corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of it is here and part of it is there, and no part of it is wholly present at two different places. Endurance corresponds to the way a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19956_3">universal</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19956_3"></A>, if there are such things, would be wholly present wherever and whenever it is instantiated. (<a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_637.htm">Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds</A>", p. 202).</ul> <BR>(Lewis had previously used  endure as the neutral word (<a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>", p.68 in <a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_37.htm">Lewis (David) - Philosophical Papers Volume II</A>")). </li><li>Lewis touched upon issues of persistence throughout his publishing career, from <a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_112.htm">Lewis (David) - Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies</A>" in 1971, to <a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19084.htm">Lewis (David) - How Many Lives Has Schrodinger's Cat?</A>" in 2004. The most extensive discussions can be found in <a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>", <a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>" and its later postscripts, <a name="20"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_637.htm">Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds</A>", <a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1241.htm">Lewis (David) - Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe</A>", and <a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4295.htm">Lewis (David) - Tensing the Copula</A>"; he remained committed to perdurance theory at every stage. In this <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19956_4">chapter</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19956_4"></A>, I will explore the connections between Lewis s perdurance theory and his Humean <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">Supervenience</A><SUP>5</SUP>, arguing that his influential argument about temporary intrinsics is best seen in this light. I then turn to a domestic dispute within the <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">anti-endurantist</A><SUP>6</SUP> camp: why does Lewis identify ordinary objects with world-bound parts of transworld objects, but not with time-bound parts of trans-temporal objects? Given that Lewis is a counterpart theorist about <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>7</SUP>, why isn t he a stage theorist about persistence? </FONT></li><li>& [& snip & ] & <BR>Intervening Sections:- <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>Section 1: Persistence and Humean <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">Supervenience</A><SUP>8</SUP></li><li>Section 2: In Defence of Stages</li><li>Section 3: Temporary Intrinsics</li><li>Section 4: Stages, or Sums of Stages? </li></ul></li><li>Not all of us share Lewis s preference for perdurance theory over <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19956_9">stage</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19956_9"></A> theory, and of course not all of us follow him in rejecting endurance theory. But his treatment of this issue  which barely reaches the surface of his writing  is an especially beautiful example of Lewisian metaphysical and semantic views working to support one another. It illustrates the systematicity of his metaphysics, integrating the rejection of worldly indeterminacy and the quasi-identification of parts and wholes with headline issues about worlds, times and properties. And it offers a master-class in the art of recognising both the power and the limitations of analogy.</li></ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>See <a name="W1072W"></a><A HREF = "https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~kjh5/OnlinePapers/LewisOnPersistence.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P19956_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19956_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: Hawley has just spelled out what Lewis means here. But is this completely obvious? I know it s only an analogy thrown in for illustrative purposes, but is it correct? In what sense are <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</a>  present , and are they really  wholly present , even if they are? Take Wittgensteinian  family resemblance concepts  is the universal  game wholly present in both rugby and chess? Is the universal  lion wholly present in each individual lion or is it spread through all past present and future members of the species  which all differ slightly. Might not <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</a> (depending on our theory of them) be just as much of an analogy to perdurantism as to <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_760.htm">endurantism</a>? Maybe take a look at <a name="21"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_39.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Universals</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P19956_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19956_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: Of <em>The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis</em>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P19956_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19956_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: Otherwise known as <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">Exdurance</a>. This is Hawley s own view. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:10" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:10:14</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>