<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Hawley (Katherine) & Bird (Alexander) - What are Natural Kinds? (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19961.htm">What are Natural Kinds?</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hawley (Katherine).htm">Hawley (Katherine)</a> & <A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Bird (Alexander).htm">Bird (Alexander)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: St. Andrews' Website; Philosophical Perspectives 25.1 (2011), 205-221.</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19961.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PapersToNotes_19961.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Introduction</U> (Section 1. Two Questions)<FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Distinguish two questions about <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>1</SUP>. <ul type="disc"><li>First, the <B>naturalness question</b>: what, if anything, makes a <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>2</SUP> natural? Perhaps the members of a <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>3</SUP>, unlike the members of an arbitrary group, stand in some natural similarity relation to one another. Perhaps they share an essence or some other natural feature. Or perhaps, as conventionalists argue, the boundaries of <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>4</SUP> do not correspond to distinctions in nature. </li><li>Second, the <b>kindhood question</b>: what, if anything, makes a <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>5</SUP> a kind? The distinction between <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>6</SUP> and other natural groupings was noted by Mill (1843: 122 3), who remarked that horses formed a <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>7</SUP> but white things do not. Mill s point is that, natural similarity among white things notwithstanding, leukocytes, chalks, white vans, clouds, comets, and degenerate (white) dwarf stars are too diverse a group to form a <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>8</SUP>. If Mill is right, then investigating the difference between grue and green, for example, will not fully illuminate <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>9</SUP>, for neither green things nor grue things form a <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>10</SUP>. </li></ul></li><li>The naturalness question has dominated debate about <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>11</SUP>, at the expense of the kindhood question. One consequence of this dominance is that certain questions concerning the ontology of <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>12</SUP> have been obscured. Richard Boyd, for example, explicitly understands questions of the form  is such-and-such a kind real? to be questions concerning naturalness and integration with inductive practices ( accommodation ). </li><li>But there are two tasks: <ul type="disc"><li>to distinguish natural from unnatural similarities  which will help explain  accommodation  and also </li><li>to understand the metaphysical status of <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>13</SUP>, distinguishing the natural similarities that underpin <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>14</SUP> from the natural similarities that do not. </li></ul>In this paper, we take the kindhood question seriously, and we examine how best to develop a realist view of <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>15</SUP>. In particular, we will articulate a view of <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>16</SUP> as complex <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>17</SUP>. We do not attempt to argue for the existence of <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>18</SUP>. Instead, we will argue that, given the existence of <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>19</SUP>, and of <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>20</SUP>, the latter can be understood in terms of the former, and that this provides a rich, flexible framework within which to discuss issues of indeterminacy, essentialism, induction, and reduction. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Two Questions</li><li>The <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19961_21">Kindhood</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19961_21"></A> Question <ul type="disc"><li>1) <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>22</SUP> are <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>23</SUP>.</li><li>2) <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>24</SUP> are particulars.</li><li>3) <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>25</SUP> are sui generis entities, neither <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>26</SUP> nor particulars. </li></ul></li><li>What are Complex <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>27</SUP>?</li><li><a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>28</SUP> as Complex <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>29</SUP><BR>& 4.1 Precise Structural Kinds <BR>& 4.2 Precise Conjunctive Kinds<BR>& 4.3 Indeterminate Kinds <BR>& 4.4 Exception-permitting Kinds?</li><li>Complex <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>30</SUP> and Homeostasis</li><li>Essences of <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>31</SUP></li><li><b>Conclusion</b>: We have not done enough to persuade the determined sceptic about <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>32</SUP>, or about <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>33</SUP> to come over to our point of view. However, we have begun to explore the potential rewards of identifying <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>34</SUP> with mereologically complex <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>35</SUP>, and thereby drawing upon a range of better-understood ideas about mereologically complex ordinary objects. Incorporating kinds into our ontology this way enables us to recognise their significance without having to posit an entirely new category of being. </li></ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>See <a name="W1076W"></a><A HREF = "https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~kjh5/OnlinePapers/WhatAreNaturalKinds.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P19961_21"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19961_21"><B>Footnote 21</B></A></U>: The authors reject out of hand the nominalist assertion that there are no such things as <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</a>. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:11" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:11:47</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>