<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Hawley (Katherine) - Mereology, Modality and Magic (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19962.htm">Mereology, Modality and Magic</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hawley (Katherine).htm">Hawley (Katherine)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: St. Andrews' Website; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88.1 (March 2010), 117-133</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PaperSummary_19962.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_19/PapersToNotes_19962.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>If the property <em>being a methane molecule</em> is a universal, then it is a structural universal: objects instantiate <em>being a methane molecule</em> just in case they have the right sorts of proper parts arranged in the right sort of way. Lewis argued (in <a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1233.htm">Lewis (David) - Against Structural Universals</A>") that there can be no satisfactory account of structural <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>; in this paper I provide a satisfactory account. </li><li>This is a pre-print of an article whose final and definitive form (was) published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy in 2009. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>Lewis s Challenge </li><li>Three conceptions of structural <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> <BR>& 3.1 The Linguistic Conception <BR>& 3.2 The Pictorial Conception <BR>& 3.3 The Magical Conception</li><li>A fourth conception of structural <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP> </li><li>Uniqueness and the Composition-Identity Analogy</li><li>Residual Magic?</li><li><a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>4</SUP> Reductionism</li><li><b>Conclusion</b>: I have not argued that <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>5</SUP> exist. There are a number of theoretical roles which could be filled by <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>6</SUP>, but there are rival candidates for those positions. Nor have I argued that, if there are <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>7</SUP>, then there are structural <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>8</SUP>: Lewis provided some arguments for this conditional claim, though the strongest has recently been under attack [Williams <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P19962_9">2007</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P19962_9"></A>]. Nevertheless I have tried to clarify the structure of Lewis s argument against structural <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>10</SUP>, highlighting its dependence both upon Leibniz s Law as the ultimate brute necessity, and upon the claim that composition must be unique if it is to avoid unacceptable brute necessities. I have undermined this second claim, I have shown what can reasonably be expected of a theory of structural <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>11</SUP>, and, finally, I have shown that any theory with the resources to provide an account of possible worlds will have to take mereological essentialism (or its equivalent) for <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>12</SUP> as brute.</li></ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>See <a name="W1077W"></a><A HREF = "https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~kjh5/OnlinePapers/MereologyModalityAndMagic" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P19962_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P19962_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: Williams, R. 2007. The Possibility of Onion Worlds: Rebutting an Argument for Structural <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</a>, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85: 193-203<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:10" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:10:16</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>