Identity and Indiscernibility
Hawley (Katherine)
Source: St. Andrews' Website; Mind 118(1) (January 2009),101-119
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles1 (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.

  1. Introduction
  2. What sort of qualitative arrangement?
  3. How to defend PII? … 3.1 The identity defence
    … 3.2 The discerning defence
    … 3.3 The summing defence
  4. So why PII? .


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