Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities and Anti-Individualism
Shagrir (Oron)
Source: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 109, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 171-196
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience1: strong global supervenience2 and weak global supervenience3. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities.
  2. In what follows, I re-examine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience)4. I argue that
    • a) weak global supervenience5 is not an adequate notion of dependence;
    • b) weak global supervenience6 does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations;
    • c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience7;
    • d) intermediate global supervenience8, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and
    • e) strong global supervenience9 is an adequate notion of dependence.
  3. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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