- Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience1: strong global supervenience2 and weak global supervenience3. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities.
- In what follows, I re-examine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience)4. I argue that
- a) weak global supervenience5 is not an adequate notion of dependence;
- b) weak global supervenience6 does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations;
- c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience7;
- d) intermediate global supervenience8, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and
- e) strong global supervenience9 is an adequate notion of dependence.
- It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)