Global Supervenience and Dependence
Bennett (Karen)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 68, No. 3 (May, 2004), pp. 501-529
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    Two versions of global supervenience1 have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience2 in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience3 has little metaphysically distinctive value.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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