Why Functionalism Didn't Work
Putnam (Hilary)
Source: Earman (John), Ed. - Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations
Paper - Abstract

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Editor’s Introduction1

  1. In his contribution Hilary Putnam explains why he has abandoned a view he helped to articulate and popularize — the computational or functional characterization of the mental. He continues to hold that mental states cannot be straightforwardly identified with physical states of the brain. But he now proposes to turn the tables on his former self by extending his own arguments, previously deployed to show that "software" is more important than "hardware," to show that mental states are not straightforwardly identical with computational states of the brain.
  2. What does Putnam propose as a replacement for functionalism? Some hints are to be found in the present paper and in his book "Putnam (Hilary) - Representation and Reality" (1988), but for a complete answer the reader will have to stay tuned for further developments.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Earman (John) - Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations: Introduction".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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