- I present an argument for panpsychism: the thesis that everything is conscious, or at least that fundamental physical entities are conscious.
- The argument takes a Hegelian dialectical form. Panpsychism emerges as a synthesis of the thesis of materialism and the antithesis of dualism.
- In particular, the key premises of the causal argument for materialism and the conceivability argument for dualism are all accommodated by a certain version of panpsychism.
- This synthesis has its own antithesis in turn: panprotopsychism, the thesis that fundamental physical entities are protoconscious, also accommodates the key premises.
- Panpsychism and panprotopsychism are synthesized under Russellian monism, and then face an antithesis, the combination problem. The question of whether there is a new synthesis remains open.
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