Author’s Introduction (Extracts1)- What are you and I essentially? When do you and I come into and go out of existence? For example, are you numerically identical to the infant that existed some time ago? How about the embryo2 or the sperm and the egg? What kind of changes can you undergo and still persist as you? Suppose you lost a finger, are you still the entity that has lost a finger? What if you lost your brain? When do you go out of existence? Do you go out of existence if you are hit on the head and a "persistent vegetative state3" results?
- A common response to the question of what we are4 essentially is that we are essentially organisms5. That is, we come into existence as organisms and go out of existence when we cease to be organisms. After all, if we were not organisms, who is the being sitting here in front of the computer writing this paper and who is the being reading this paper? This view, call it the Organism View, might seem obviously true especially to scientists. However, for quite some time, a number of philosophers have rejected it in favor of the Psychological6 View. The Psychological View holds that some kind of psychological continuity7 (e.g., mental contents or the base capacity for consciousness) is required for identity. This view implies, among other things, that we come into existence only when some kind of psychological state is present. An often used argument to motivate this view is the brain8 transplant9 argument.
- In this paper, I would like to consider McMahan's10 two cases11 against the Organism View and show that in fact, they do not undermine it. Since it is possible to devise more McMahanian-type cases, another aim of this paper is to give a more general solution to these kinds of cases. To do this, I begin with an account of the Organism View.
Sections- McMahan's Challenge
- An Account of the Organism View
- The Dicephalus12 Case and the Modified Commissurotomy13 Case
- The Extreme Case, Organismic Divisions, and the Genetic Engineering Case
- Conclusion
Comments- McMahan's Challenge
- See the footnotes for my comments on the quoted passages from the Author’s Introduction.
- Brain transplants14 are often rejected as suitable TEs15 because they are (presently) unrealistic. Laio cites
- As another objection, he alludes to Parfit’s16 camp who claim that “identity is not what matters17” as though this is an objection18 to brain-transplant19 TEs. In this connection, he mentions "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology".Olson (it seems) argues that people may be metaphysically misled by their quasi-prudential20 concern for the recipient of their cerebrum-based21 psychology to think that they would have switched bodies when their cerebrums22 have.
- So, McMahan – a supporter of the PV23 – has come up with a couple of alternatives.
- The first is the Dicephalus24, Abigail and Brittany Hensel being named. The case is discussed in "McMahan (Jeff) - The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life", p. 35, McMahan’s conclusion being that we have two persons, but only one25 organism. Since the twins26 are distinct persons, from the logic of identity neither can be identical to the organism. Further, this non-identity can be predicated of the rest of us, since there is no fundamental difference27 between us and them.
- The second is hemispheric commissurotomy28. Because information fed to one hemisphere may be hidden from the other29, the possibility arises of divided consciousness, though "Robinson (John) - Personal Identity and Survival" disputes this conclusion. To achieve divided consciousness, McMahan proposes (a TE of) commissurotomy30 at birth, with each hemisphere in turn resented with different stimuli while the other is anaesthetised. This, he claims, would result in two31 minds, and therefore two persons, while only a single organism. Again, it is assumed there is no significant difference32 between this can and the rest of us.
- An Account of the Organism View
- Liao adopts the Life Process account of organisms33. Such processes include metabolism, growth, assimilation, responsiveness, movement and reproduction, as well as respiration, digestion, absorption, circulation, excretion, differentiation, etc.
- Liao now gives his understanding of the Organism View34 which is that X is essentially an organism if it satisfies the following three criteria, the first of which (“a”) he takes to be clear:-
- X begins to exist when the capacity to regulate and coordinate metabolic and other life processes is there.
- X persists as long as there is what may be called "organismic continuity," which is the continuing ability to regulate and coordinate metabolic and other life processes; and
- X ceases35 to exist when the capacity to regulate and coordinate metabolic and other life processes is permanently gone.
- With reference to (b), Liao explains organismic continuity, but first introduces physical continuity and functional continuity, without obviously connecting them to organismic continuity. Physical continuity: requires either the same constituent matter, or its gradual, incremental replacement. Functional continuity: requires retention of capacities. Organismic continuity: requires the same coordinating and regulating capacity of the life processes, where Liao’s – presumably positive – example is the replacement of the natural heart by an artificial one.
- With reference to (c), Liao considers permanently gone. In a footnote36, he remarks on the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of permanence. Identity is preserved if the loss of life-function is temporary, while it is lost – and the organism considered “dead37” – if they cannot be reinstated “by any means”.
- As an illustration, Liao considers the life-path of a bacterium. Its life commences on completion of binary fission38, and continues in the face of some exchange of material with its environment until it either dies or divides39.
- Liao now considers the accuracy of the application of the Organism View to us. It is uncontroversial that this view (that they are essentially organisms) applies to living things “up to” non-conscious40 animals.
- The Dicephalus41 Case and the Modified Commissurotomy42 Case
- The Extreme Case, Organismic Divisions, and the Genetic Engineering Case
- Conclusion
Comment:
Hard copy in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 09 (L)".
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 1: Basically, the first one and a half and the last of six paragraphs of the section McMahan's Challenge.
Footnote 5: - So, Liao’s stance – the Organism View (OV) is that we are essentially organisms. This is Liao’s answer to the question “What are we?”.
- Liao lists the following books and papers as references for the OV:-
- I’m not sure whether the OV is the same as Animalism. Verbally, it is; yet Liao’s intuitions on some of the key TEs are not the same as Olson’s.
- Olson famously denies that psychology has anything to do with our identity, so we “don’t go where our cerebrums go”. Liao seems to consider “brains” – which support the life-process – as being the essential us, so we go where our brains go. He seems committed to the view that we are essentially brains. I agree that the brain is not “just another organ”, so may incline towards Liao as against Olson. But Liao only considers a few cases.
Footnote 6: - This is not my (or Liao’s) favoured position, so I won’t remark on it extensively.
- Liao’s quoted authorities for this view are:-
- "Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity" (of course),
- "Grice (H. Paul) - Personal Identity",
- "Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?",
- "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons",
- Parfit, Derek, "Experiences, Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes," Philosophical Topics 26 (1999): 217-70,
- "Nozick (Robert) - Philosophical Explanations",
- "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings",
- "Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity",
- "Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value",
- "Martin (Raymond) - Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival",
- "Unger (Peter) - The Survival of the Sentient",
- "McMahan (Jeff) - The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life".
- Liao does not consider Lynne Rudder Baker and her Constitution View, despite the fact that there is a paper by Baker in this very symposium ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality").
Footnote 8: - The example Liao gives is in fact a (double) cerebrum transplant, with the recipient-organism’s (double) cerebrum being destroyed.
- This is distinct from a Whole-brain transplant, as Liao ought to recognise, but maybe does not.
- The presumption – on the part of the holder of the psychological view – is that the recipient of the cerebrum is identical to the cerebrum-donor, because (it is assumed) this person inherits the donor’s psychology.
- It is also assumed that the cerebrumless donor is still an organism – indeed, the same organism, as prior to donation. This assumes that no cerebrum is essential for (human) organic life. This is probably correct, even though vision and motor co-ordination are performed in the cerebra.
- So as not to beg the question, Liao uses the “quasi-” terminology introduced (he says; though my Note does not mention either) by Parfit and Shoemaker, because it is not possible – logically-speaking – for one person to have another’s memories, so they can only quasi-remember. Yet, if that person is identical to the person who had the remembered experiences, then there is no need for the “quasi-” prefix.
Footnote 10: Taken from "McMahan (Jeff) - The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life".
Footnote 11: The other being hemispheric commissurotomy.
Footnote 18: He doesn’t explain why, but – I suppose – if “identity is not what matters”, then we won’t care who is (identical to) whom, so the TE loses its force; but then so would McMahan’s alternatives.
Footnote 20: - As (according to Olson, you are not the recipient of your cerebrum, you can be concerned for that individual, but nor prudentially concerned. Hence, the “quasi-”.
- However, these people think – whether they are identical to the recipient or not – that they themselves will suffer whatever the recipient suffers. They would deny there is any need for the “quasi-” prefix. They would argue that their very own FPP goes with the cerebra.
- Olson would argue that they are mistaken; they just lose consciousness and someone else inherits their psychology. They may rightly be concerned that these people make the best of it, and follow through the donor’s projects, but this is not prudential concern, which can only be had for oneself.
Footnote 25: - Naturally, Liao will dispute this claim, rightly so.
- The best way of describing the case is that there are two, partially-overlapping, organisms that share parts.
- The reason for choosing this description is that we have two brain-stems, which separately control parts of the conjoined bodies.
- The fact that neither twin can survive without the other is no objection to this account, as it applies to conjoined twins that are separable (and therefore distinct, from modal considerations).
Footnote 27: - This is always open to dispute in the more extreme cases.
- In particular, the diprosopus, where there may only be one brain-stem.
Footnote 29: See, for example, "Puccetti (Roland) - The Case For Mental Duality: Evidence From Split-Brain Data and Other Considerations".
Footnote 31: Or, maybe, the limiting case of a single highly schizoid person.
Footnote 32: This claim can also be doubted. If we are talking about us, and are adopting a PV, then a very different psychological experience from what we, in general, have may make the TE irrelevant.
Footnote 33: I suspect this is fair enough, though I note that "Feldman (Fred) - Life-Functional Theories of Life" finds many difficulties with the Life-Process account of life.
Footnote 34: This seems a little muddled, in that the View is that we are essentially organisms, while the text says something about what it is to be essentially an organism.
Footnote 35: So, presumably, neither corpses nor those on (permanent) life-support are organisms.
Footnote 36: We are referred to:- . Footnote 38: Fission of human blastocycts is considered in "Shoemaker (David) - Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension", where the perdurantist view that the pre-fission entity continues to exist is supported.
Footnote 39: Division is more positive than death, but is still (taken as) a “ceasing to exist” as, it is said, the pre-fission bacterium suffers a “permanent organismic discontinuity”.
Footnote 40: In a footnote, he points out that "Unger (Peter) - The Survival of the Sentient", and probably other holders of the PV, apply the brain-transplant intuition to all conscious animals.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)