Disassembly and Destruction
Hazlett (Allan)
Source: The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 418-433
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. In ontology it is common to endorse some version of this principle:
      Locality Thesis (LT): Whether p1 . . . pn compose something supervenes1 only on the spatial and causal relations obtaining between p1 . . . pn.
  2. My contention in this paper is that LT is false, because whether an object that has been disassembled has also been destroyed supervenes2 on whether it will be reassembled at some point in the future.
  3. In the first section of the paper I discuss the main motivation for LT, and indicate sympathy for it.
  4. In Section 2 I present a counterexample to LT and explain where I think this puts the defenders of LT, dialectically.
  5. In Section 3 I respond to an objection from Michael Burke3 to my claim in Section 2 that no ordinary material object ever ceases to exist and then comes back into existence as a result of disassembly and reassembly.
  6. In the final section I suggest why LT fails to capture the motivating intuitions, and propose an alternative.


Hard copy in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 07 (H)".

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3: In "Burke (Michael) - Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence".

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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