Immortality and Boredom: A Response to Wisnewski
Burley (Mikel)
Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Apr., 2009) (pp. 77-85)
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. This article contributes to the ongoing debate initiated by Bernard Williams' claim (in "Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality") that, due to the non-contingent finitude of the categorical desires that give meaning to our lives, an immortal life would necessarily become intolerably boring.
  2. Jeremy Wisnewski has argued that even if immortality involves periods in which our categorical desires have been exhausted, this need not divest life of meaning since some categorical desires are revivable.
  3. I argue that careful reflection upon the thought experiments1 adduced by Wisnewski reveals that they do not substantiate his proposal, and hence that a plausible reason for rejecting Williams' position has not been provided.

Comment:

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