- If death is bad for the one who died, then it must be a very peculiar kind of misfortune indeed. It is certainly not the kind the "victim" could conceivably complain about, because a dead person can neither know, nor appreciate, nor in any possible way experience any effects of death.
- What could be bad which could have no bad effects - in fact, no effects at all? Would it not be more reasonable to say with Epicurus that, rightly understood, "death is nothing to us"?
- The most popular view about how death might nevertheless be bad for the one who died relies on a deprivation approach, according to which death can be bad because it deprives the former person of the goods which would have been available in a counterfactually longer life.
- I aim to show that the deprivation approach is flawed on three counts.
- First of all, death is not a deprivation on any reasonable understanding of what deprivation is.
- Second, the deprivation approach does not show that death is bad in any recognizable sense for the deceased.
- And third, some deprivation views rely on a life-life (or, more accurately, actual-life vs. counterfactually longer life) comparison, yet such a comparison does not yield the conclusion that death can be bad for the one who died.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)