<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20229.htm">Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/M/Author_Marshall (Richard).htm">Marshall (Richard)</a> & <A HREF = "../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Olson (Eric)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20229.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PapersToNotes_20229.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Editor's <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_1">Introduction</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Eric T. Olson is the proponent of "<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>2</SUP>," which argues that we are animals and that there is no metaphysical gulf between humans and the rest. </li><li>He points out what this position commits him to accepting and rejecting and shows that it is a surprisingly rare position in the history of philosophy, and humankind generally. </li><li>As part of this, he introduces the issue of personal identity, taking in <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>3</SUP> about <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplants</A><SUP>4</SUP> and computer-generated life and a paper he wrote entitled <a name="36"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7348.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why I Have No Hands</A>" which is part of a discussion on "partism." </li><li>He also discusses the relationship of philosophy to science and why philosophy is often neglected in contemporary culture. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Notes</u><ol type="1"><li>While this is an interview  and therefore informal  as it hails from 2012 it gives a fairly contemporary account of Olson s views  or at least their public face. </li><li>Olson is asked to justify why most philosophers deny that we are animals. Olson s response is that:- <ul type="disc"><li>What separates us from other animals is our intelligence  and while this creates a gulf  of disputable size  it s not a <em><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_5">metaphysical</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_5"></A></em> gulf. </li><li>People thought that we could not be our bodies because they were convinced  at least up until the 1960s  that no matter  however sophisticated  could produce thought.</li><li>Another reason is that it seems odd to say  for example  that  Bertrand Russell s body argued such-and-such , so we might assume that <em>we</em> are not our bodies. Olson thinks this just sophistry   a person s body are weasel words  but that it betrays a lot of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_6">crypto-dualism</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_6"></A> around in philosophy. </li><li>They also find it demeaning to be  nothing more than animals . </li></ul></li><li>But, the real <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">arguments against animalism</A><SUP>7</SUP> arise from its disagreement with commonly-held ideas about our persistence-conditions. <ul type="disc"><li>Olson rehearses his usual comparison between liver and <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplants</A><SUP>8</SUP>  why does one preserve your identity while the other does not?</li><li>Why do (most) people describe a <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain-transplant</A><SUP>9</SUP> as a <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">body-transplant</A><SUP>10</SUP>? Because a psychological-continuity account of personal identity is current philosophical orthodoxy. </li><li>But this rules out our being animals, as an animal is not <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_104.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>11</SUP>, just an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_12">organ</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_12"></A>, when a <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain is transplanted</A><SUP>13</SUP>. </li></ul></li><li>He repeats the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_14">fetus</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_14"></A> argument for the irrelevance of <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>15</SUP> for  our identity. </li><li>The motivation for maintaining <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>16</SUP> in the face of pressure from the PV is Olson s Master (or <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Thinking Animal)</A><SUP>17</SUP> argument  the usual stuff about there being twice as many thinkers if we are not identical to  our animals, and us not knowing whether we are the person or the animal, if human persons are not identical to  their animals. </li><li>What is <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>18</SUP>? That the organism you see in the mirror is you. Only your  identity in the popular sense has anything to do with <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>19</SUP>  your continued existence across time does not. </li><li>And what does animal identity consist in? An organism is a dynamic system and matter flows through it like water through a fountain. The organism continues to exist  despite interchange of matter  as long as its <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_20">life-sustaining</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_20"></A> functions continue. </li><li>What about  downloading consciousness or cloning bodies? <ul type="disc"><li>Olson describes  <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_939.htm">Transhumanism</A><SUP>21</SUP> . He points out how far off it is, practically-speaking, even if it makes sense. </li><li>He doubts <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_48.htm">Brain State Transfers</A><SUP>22</SUP> are even possible, or that inorganic beings could be conscious or intelligent.</li><li>Copying obviously suffers from reduplication objections. All would be deluded. </li><li>Also  an analogy  you can t copy and animal by copying its mental states any more than you can copy a computer by copying a file. </li><li>Scanning need not destroy your mental states, in which case you d have a prior claim to be you over any recipient. So, why is a recipient  you in the normal <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_23">case</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_23"></A>. </li></ul></li><li><b>Computer-generated life</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Could computer-programming not just <u>simulate</u> life (like it can simulate the weather) but <u>create</u> it? </li><li>Olson thinks this to be metaphysically impossible. Such attempts do not create anything like life, which requires organisms. </li><li>He asks rhetorical questions  where would such a life-form be, and how big? These questions are pertinent if the so-called artificial life is a computer-program, rather than the computer itself (else we would know the answers). </li><li>But  while he says he s considered such questions  he doesn t really do so here, and gives no <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_24">references</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_24"></A>. </li></ul></li><li><b>Artificial intelligence</b>: Olson s objections are the same as to artificial life  in that (he says) intelligence is the possession of a <u>being</u>, which requires location, etc. This has nothing to do with the sophistication of the programming, so may also be a metaphysical <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_25">impossibility</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_25"></A>. </li><li><a name="37"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7348.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why I Have No Hands</A>": <ul type="disc"><li>Olson s objections to the existence of (arbitrary) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_26">undetached</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_26"></A> parts are similar to the problems he raises in his <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Master Argument</A><SUP>27</SUP>. It is effectively  The problem of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_28">many</A></U><SUB>28</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_28"></A> ,  <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_871.htm">Dion and Theon </A><SUP>29</SUP>, or  <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tib and Tibbles</A><SUP>30</SUP> , so is nothing new. This is despite Olson claiming (doubtless correctly) that his paper was rejected as  frivolous by half a dozen journals. </li><li>It s important, though as a whole nexus of metaphysical issues associated with constitution and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_31">vagueness</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_31"></A> gets involved. </li><li>Olson admits that there are particles  arranged manually but claims they don t constitute anything larger (a hand) because  if they did  then there would be a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_32">hand-complement</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_32"></A> that could think, and again we d have <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">too many thinkers</A><SUP>33</SUP>. </li><li>Of course, what goes for hands goes for other parts also  including my <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_34">head</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_34"></A>. </li></ul></li><li><b>Partism</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Hud Hudson s view that  a thing can have different parts in different <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_35">places</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_35"></A> . </li><li>Olson explains that  according to Hudson  my hand-complement <u>is</u> me. Things can have different parts at different <em>times</em> (as does <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_871.htm">Dion</A><SUP>36</SUP>), but Hudson (it seems) says they can have different parts at different <em>places</em>. </li><li>So: <FONT COLOR = "800080">The hand could be a part of both me and my hand-complement (which are the same thing) at the place where the hand is located, and not a part of either being at some other place. What appear to be two things with different parts are in some cases just one thing, made up of more than one set of parts at once. </FONT></li><li>Olson generalises this to the <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_44.htm">Ship of Theseus</A><SUP>37</SUP> case  so that according to Hudson the repaired ship and the reconstructed ship are the very same ship, or at least there is only one ship with different parts in different places. The ship in the museum has, it seems, been at sea at the same time as it stayed dry. </li><li>Olson agrees that this is difficult to understand, yet alone believe. And, it seems, Hudson does think that they are two ships, but Olson doesn t think he s any principled reason for thinking so, nor an explanation of where Partism does and doesn t <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_38">apply</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_38"></A>. </li></ul></li><li><a name="57"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/V/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A>: Olson is impressed by Van Inwagen  starting from <a name="60"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_49.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings</A>"  not by the strangeness of his views (there are no material things except elementary particles and living organisms) but by his arguments. He thinks everything is clear once Van Inwagen has finished. His critics just shroud things in mist again. </li><li><a name="58"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Stanley (Jason).htm">Jason Stanley</A>: likened philosophy to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_39">novel-writing</A></U><SUB>39</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_39"></A>. Olson thinks this is because philosophers think of Plato as a deceased colleague (as a novelist thinks of Dickens), not as an object of study (as a historian of ideas does). He doesn t see any greater connection, and the same point could be made by comparing philosophy with physics rather than the history of science, or pole vaulting and sports science. </li><li><b>Philosophy and Science</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>Science influences philosophy  eg. advances in cosmology have raised  fine tuning arguments for the existence of God. Also (opaquely) <FONT COLOR = "800080">the science of colour vision has demolished volumes of a priori philosophising </FONT>. </li><li>But, science cannot eliminate philosophy, if only because deciding the appropriate methodology of science is a philosophical question. </li></ul></li><li>Is contemporary philosophy too dry and technical? <ul type="disc"><li>Olson does not think so. This compliant could be made against the great works of any period of philosophy; eg. <BR>&rarr; <a name="61"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_578.htm">Kant (Immanuel), Kemp Smith (Norman) - Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason</A>",<BR>&rarr; <a name="62"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_613.htm">Hume (David), Mossner (Ernest) - A Treatise of Human Nature</A>"<BR>&rarr; or, anything by Aristotle, Aquinas or Hegel. </li><li>Olson suspects the critics just find philosophy too hard  as it is. And no-one would expect to be able to tackle a serious work on physics  as distinct from a popularisation  without training. </li><li>Olson thinks that contemporary philosophy does address the questions ordinary people care about, though maybe not in <em>Mind</em> or <em>Analysis</em>. </li><li>He thinks academic philosophical writing may be less clear than it needs be  partly because it s easier to get published if your writing isn t so clear that the weak points of your arguments are plain for peer-reviewers to see! </li></ul></li><li><b>Experimental Philosophy</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>This (says Olson) involves doing polls to check philosophical intuitions  e.g. in ethics. Relying on your own or your colleagues or students can skew the results as people s responses depends on their background, and the way the questions are phrased or sequenced. </li><li>Olson isn t interested, however, as he doesn t rely on ordinary opinion, as this has nothing to say about the truth of those opinions. Maybe most people would support the <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplant</A><SUP>40</SUP> intuition. But they are probably wrong because the consequences of this belief are  to Olson  philosophically unacceptable. But he would be  interested is a poll showed that most people <em>didn t</em> support the psychological-continuity view. </li><li>Olson doesn t mind going against the intuitions or ordinary folk but he does worry about going against those of his colleagues, who have as much right to hold them as he does. </li><li>He makes an interesting point that it s the <em>consequences</em> of the intuitions that are critical in deciding the truth of the intuitions themselves, and it s the structure of what follows from what, rather than the truth of the intuitions  that is the more solid. He gives his favourite example  if we are not animals, then it follows that the animal  you live in cannot think, and so on. The controversy is about whether <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20229_41">these</A></U><SUB>41</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20229_41"></A> consequences are acceptable. </li></ul></li><li>The on-line version of the interview (see <a name="W2269W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/The-Philosopher-with-No-Hands/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>)  in addition to the printed text  gives an account of Olson s reasons for taking up Philosophy and lists his favourite books on metaphysics that he thinks 3:AM readers might enjoy. They are:- <ul type="disc"><li>Richard Taylor - <em>Metaphysics</em>. <FONT COLOR = "800080"> This short book is about as accessible as philosophy gets. It covers most of the juicy topics you d hope to find in a metaphysics book, including fatalism (which Taylor endorses) and the meaning of life </FONT>.</li><li><a name="63"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4094.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Metaphysics</A>": <FONT COLOR = "800080">  More careful and less provocative than Taylor, but equally fascinating </FONT>. </li><li>Asbjrn Steglich-Petersen, ed., <em>Metaphysics: 5 Questions</em>. <FONT COLOR = "800080"> A book of interviews with contemporary metaphysicians </FONT>.</li><li><a name="64"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_418.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Metaphysics: The Big Questions</A>": <FONT COLOR = "800080">  A large collection with something for everyone </FONT>.</li><li><a name="65"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5724.htm">Hudson (Hud) - The Metaphysics of Hyperspace</A>": <FONT COLOR = "800080">  A delightful book, though not suitable for beginners </FONT>. </li></ul></li></ol><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>For the interview on-line, see <a name="W2269W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/The-Philosopher-with-No-Hands/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>,</li><li>The interview was undertaken in May 2012,</li><li>The on-line text contains some extra information, both biographical and "best books". </li></ul><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: In <a name="38"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20221.htm">Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Introduction</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: So, Olson just brushes aside Baker s claim  eg. in <a name="39"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14448.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics</A>" - that it <u>is</u> a metaphysical gulf, but read on & . <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_6"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: As <a name="59"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Papineau (David).htm">David Papineau</A> says in <a name="40"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16121.htm">Papineau (David) - The Importance of Philosophical Intuition</A>", if we have doubts about the  explanatory gap concerning consciousness, then we re not really materialists at heart. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_12"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I think this is a mistake  in that a whole brain is a special organ because of its regulatory functions rather than its psychological ones. </li><li>Also, fitting a <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted brain</a> into another body has lots of issues other than engineering ones  it is tied to the PNS and the body it regulates. </li><li>But I d probably agree with Olson if he stuck to <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplants</a> (though some regulation is cerebral, I think).</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_14"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_14"><B>Footnote 14</B></A></U>: He actually says  <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryo </a>, which is controversial because of <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twinning</a> possibilities. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_20"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_20"><B>Footnote 20</B></A></U>: This is another problem with <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBTs</a> for <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">animalists</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_23"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_23"><B>Footnote 23</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Isn t this Parfit s  Branch Line case? </li><li>Parfit concludes that  identity is not <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters </a>. </li><li>Olson doesn t mention Parfit here  does he engage with his elsewhere? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_24"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_24"><B>Footnote 24</B></A></U>: I have an unread paper  <a name="41"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7350.htm">Olson (Eric) - Computer-Generated Life</A>"  that seems to fit the bill perfectly. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_25"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_25"><B>Footnote 25</B></A></U>: Again, Olson gives no attention here to the possibility that the computer itself might be intelligent. Does he elsewhere? <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_26"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_26"><B>Footnote 26</B></A></U>: See also, on various sides of the debate<ul type="disc"><li><a name="42"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6091.htm">Carter (William) - In Defense of Undetached Parts</A>", </li><li><a name="43"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5328.htm">Parsons (Josh) - Dion, Theon, and DAUP</A>", </li><li><a name="44"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4425.htm">Olson (Eric) - Dion's Foot</A>", and</li><li><a name="45"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2010.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_28"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_28"><B>Footnote 28</B></A></U>: See <ul type="disc"><li><a name="46"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16637.htm">Bennett (Karen) - Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology</A>", </li><li><a name="47"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11991.htm">Jones (Nicholas K.) - Too Many Cats: The Problem of the Many and the Metaphysics of Vagueness</A>", </li><li><a name="48"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3626.htm">Hudson (Hud) - The Many Problematic Solutions To the Problem Of the Many</A>", </li><li><a name="49"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6038.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - The Problems of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution</A>", </li><li> <a name="50"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5846.htm">Sanford (David H.) - The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology</A>" </li><li><a name="51"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15877.htm">Tye (Michael) - Fuzzy Realism and the Problem of the Many</A>", </li><li><a name="52"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6621.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Problem of the Many</A>", </li><li><a name="53"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3549.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Composition</A>", and</li><li><a name="54"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4714.htm">Weatherson (Brian) - The Problem of the Many</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_31"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_31"><B>Footnote 31</B></A></U>: This shows that there must be something wrong with Olson s <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Master Argument</a> as, if sound, it implies that nothing exists other than simples  or that  unbeknownst to us  there is (at a time) some unique collection of particles that constitutes a <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_32"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: Is there any mileage in claiming that, while hands exist, hand-complements don t? Olson asks, but doesn t answer, this question. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_34"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_34"><B>Footnote 34</B></A></U>: Olson says that a  variant of the argument applies to this case  it s evidently different to the <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Thinking Animal</a> (Master) argument, because the head-complement doesn t do any thinking. Does this relate to <a name="55"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5028.htm">Mackie (David) - Going Topless</A>"? Probably not, as this relates to <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplants</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_35"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: This is Marshall s definition, but it can t be right, can it? Doesn t anything that has parts have them in different places? This is spelled out later. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_38"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: Well, Partism sounds incoherent from this account, but presumably it s best to read <a name="66"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_109.htm">Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person</A>" (and probably <a name="67"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5724.htm">Hudson (Hud) - The Metaphysics of Hyperspace</A>" as well) before deciding. <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_39"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_39"><B>Footnote 39</B></A></U>: Presumably in <a name="56"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20226.htm">Marshall (Richard) & Stanley (Jason) - Jason Stanley: Philosophy as the Great Naivete</A>", though I missed it! <a name="On-Page_Link_P20229_41"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20229_41"><B>Footnote 41</B></A></U>: Well, not quite. It s whether the  <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">too many thinkers </a> issue is a real one anyway, or whether it can be resolved linguistically (or otherwise). <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:15" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:15:55</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>