Paradoxes of multi-location
Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil)
Source: Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 106-114
Paper - Abstract

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Authors’ Abstract

  1. Call theses of multi-location philosophical doctrines that hold that one and the same entity can be wholly present and located at distinct space-time regions.
  2. Several substantial metaphysical theses are theses of multi-location.
    • One is endurantism1, the doctrine that in persisting, an object O is wholly temporally located at each time of its persistence.
    • The second thesis of multi-location is the immanence conception of universals2 according to which they do not transcend space-time. On this view, universals3 are spatio-temporally located where they are instantiated (either by space-time regions or by particulars located at space-time regions).
  3. In this paper we argue first, assuming 4-Dimensionalism, or4 eternalism, about time, that multi-location doctrines, given reasonable assumptions about mereology and location, entail contradictions: that one and the same entity is both 3- and 4-dimensional - paradox 1 below.
  4. We then show that, given even leaner assumptions about location, we get another version of the paradox - paradox 2.
  5. Finally, we show that a tensed version of paradox 2 arises if we assume 3-Dimensionalism or presentism about time. .

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 4: This seems to imply that 4-D and eternalism are the same thing, when (I think) they are orthogonal concepts.

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