Non-paradoxical multi-location
Beebee (Helen) & Rush (Michael)
Source: Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 311-317
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Authors’ Introduction

  1. Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe ("Barker (Stephen) & Dowe (Phil) - Paradoxes of multi-location", 2003) claim that three paradoxes can be generated by the claim that there are multiply located entities - for example, enduring particulars, enduring tropes, and immanent universals1 - with the second and third paradox each involving weaker assumptions than their predecessors.
  2. We argue that neither of the first two alleged paradoxes are really paradoxes, at least with respect to the view that there are enduring particulars.
  3. It is an interesting question whether our responses can be made to work for the other cases of multiple location, but not one that we shall attempt to answer.
  4. In addition we leave to the reader the solution to the third paradox, since it turns on the same claim about temporary parts as does the solution to the second.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Jan 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page