Notes on Kripke, 'Identity and Necessity'
Funkhouser (Eric)
Source: Funkhouser (Eric) - Metaphysics, Spring 2014
Paper - Abstract

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    ”Kripke famously argued that the necessary truths do not always coincide with the a priori truths. Provide one of his examples of the necessary a posteriori. How does Kripke explain the appearance of contingency in your example? How would Locke either agree or disagree with Kripke when it comes to understanding this example?”


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