Actualism and Thisness
Adams (Robert Merrihew)
Source: Synthese 49 (1981) 3-41
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. My thesis is that all possibilities are purely qualitative except insofar as they involve individuals that actually exist.
  2. I have argued elsewhere (Adams, 1979b1) that thisness2 holds a place beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality – and not only of reality but also of some possibilities. There are facts, and also possibilities, that are not purely qualitative.
  3. The thesis of the present essay is that all the non-qualitative possibilities are possibilities for actual individuals.
    • I will begin by trying to explain the meaning of this claim (Section 1);
    • then I will defend it (Section 2), and
    • develop some of its implications for modality3, of which the chief is that what modal4 facts de re there are depends on what individuals actually exist (Sections 3 and 4).


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In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: See "Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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