<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons, Animals, and Identity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20427.htm">Persons, Animals, and Identity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Shoemaker (Sydney).htm">Shoemaker (Sydney)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Synthese, Vol. 162, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 313-324</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20427.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PapersToNotes_20427.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</A><SUP>1</SUP> accounts. </li><li>Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplants</A><SUP>2</SUP> or <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplants</A><SUP>3</SUP> are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. </li><li>This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the "is" is the "is" of constitution rather than the "is" of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of "animal" different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. </li><li>Another challenge is the "<a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">too many minds</A><SUP>4</SUP> problem": if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervene</A><SUP>5</SUP> on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. </li><li>The response to this invokes a distinction between "thin" properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and "thick" properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. </li><li>The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles. </li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>Hard Copy in <a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5974.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 16 (S1: Sa-Sl)</A>".<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:19" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:19:31</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>