Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory
Zimmerman (Dean)
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 106, No. 422 (Apr., 1997), pp. 305-309
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    In this dialogue – a minor sequel to Max Black's classic, "The Identity of Indiscernibles1," Mind 61 (19522), – interlocutor A defends the bundle theory from B's objection that it renders impossible an evidently possible state of affairs: namely, that there be a symmetrical universe, such as Black's world consisting of nothing but two indiscernible spheres. A's strategy is that of John O'Leary-Hawthorne, "The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles3," Analysis 55 (19954). B argues that, although A may have made room for symmetrical worlds, there are other evident possibilities ruled out by the bundle theory.

Comment:

See "Zimmerman (Dean) - Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory" for an expanded version.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2: See "Black (Max) - The Identity of Indiscernibles".

Footnote 4: See "O'Leary-Hawthorne (John) - The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles".


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