|Conceptual Problems Confronting a Totally Disembodied Afterlife|
|Drange (Theodore M.)|
|Source: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 12|
|Paper - Abstract|
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This paper presents and defends an argument for the conclusion that a personal afterlife2 in the absence of any sort of body at all is not conceptually possible. The main idea behind the argument is that there would be no way for the identities of people in a bodiless state to be established, either by others or by themselves. The argument raises a significant challenge to explaining just how someone in a totally disembodied3 afterlife4 could ever be identified — a challenge that has yet to be met.
Footnote 1: Taken from Link.
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