The Pluralizability Objection to a New-Body Afterlife
Drange (Theodore M.)
Source: Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 18
Paper - Abstract

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Editors’ Abstract1

    This paper presents and defends that an afterlife2 in which a person receives a new body after his or her old body is destroyed (as it is on some notions of bodily resurrection) is conceptually impossible. The main idea behind this argument is that such an afterlife3 would conceptually require that a person be a kind of thing that could be rendered plural. But since persons are not that type of thing, such an afterlife4 is not conceptually possible.

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Footnote 1: Taken from Link.

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