The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem
Sutton (Catherine S.)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 257 (October 2014): 619 –639
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Persons think. Bodies, temporal parts of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair.
  2. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers1 and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is exactly what we should expect at the intersection of part sharing and the supervenience2 of the mental on the physical.
  3. I end by responding to the overcrowding objection, the personhood objection, the personal-pronoun reference problem, and the epistemic objection.


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