- The first chapter examines three versions of dualism:
- Substance Dualism,
- Compound Dualism, and
- Emergent Dualism.
- What all these dualisms have in common is a belief that human beings are composed of immaterial souls, either in the sense of being identical with immaterial souls or in the sense of being a compound of immaterial souls and material bodies. Dualists are also committed to the belief that we can, in some sense, survive the death of our bodies.
- I point out the philosophical problems confronting these versions of dualism and argue that, although each is compatible with key Christian beliefs, they are nevertheless mistaken views of human nature.
- Substance Dualism: Plato
- Substance Dualism: Rene Descartes
- The Initial Argument
- The Separability Argument
- The Divisibility Argument
- The Simple Argument
- Problems for Substance Dualism
- Compound Dualism: Thomas Aquinas
- Compound Dualism: Substance Dualism After All?
- The Trouble with Compound Dualism
- A New Kind of Dualism: Emergent Dualism
- Emergent Dualism Challenged
- The Problem of Re-Embodied Souls
- Materialism, Unity of Consciousness2, and Spatial Souls
Footnote 1: Taken from "Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: Introduction - What Kind of Things Are We?".
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