Dualist Views of Human Persons
Corcoran (Kevin)
Source: Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature, Chapter 1
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. The first chapter examines three versions of dualism:
    • Substance Dualism,
    • Compound Dualism, and
    • Emergent Dualism.
  2. What all these dualisms have in common is a belief that human beings are composed of immaterial souls, either in the sense of being identical with immaterial souls or in the sense of being a compound of immaterial souls and material bodies. Dualists are also committed to the belief that we can, in some sense, survive the death of our bodies.
  3. I point out the philosophical problems confronting these versions of dualism and argue that, although each is compatible with key Christian beliefs, they are nevertheless mistaken views of human nature.

  1. Substance Dualism: Plato
  2. Substance Dualism: Rene Descartes
    1. The Initial Argument
    2. The Separability Argument
    3. The Divisibility Argument
    4. The Simple Argument
  3. Problems for Substance Dualism
  4. Compound Dualism: Thomas Aquinas
  5. Compound Dualism: Substance Dualism After All?
  6. The Trouble with Compound Dualism
  7. A New Kind of Dualism: Emergent Dualism
  8. Emergent Dualism Challenged
  9. The Problem of Re-Embodied Souls
  10. Materialism, Unity of Consciousness2, and Spatial Souls
  11. Conclusion

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: Introduction - What Kind of Things Are We?".

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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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