- I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self-consciousness1, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person.
- I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. And that pre-identification typically runs on biological lines.
- Except in some interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals2 that we identify as persons.
- See Link.
- The pdf has the text repeated 4 times, so be careful when printing off!
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