<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20895.htm">Personal Identity and Time Travel</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/E/Author_Ehring (Douglas).htm">Ehring (Douglas)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20895.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperCitings_20895.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PapersToNotes_20895.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="I"><li>Introduction</li><li>Divided Consciousness and Multiple Bodies</li><li>Physical-Causal Independence</li><li>Memory </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Notes</u><ol type="I"><li><b>Introduction</b><ol type="1"><li>I imagine this paper is high on the hit-list of those who object to the use of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TE</A><SUP>1</SUP>s in the philosophy of Personal Identity. It involves three levels of (at least) technological impossibility:- <ol type="i"><li>A double <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_48.htm">brain-state transfer</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li><a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1133.htm">Time travel</A><SUP>3</SUP>, and</li><li>Pre-cognition </ol></li><li>The purpose of the paper is to rescue the <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">Psychological View</A><SUP>4</SUP> from the problems of <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">fission</A><SUP>5</SUP>. These problems can in all likelihood be overcome by adopting a <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantist</A><SUP>6</SUP> approach to persistence, but many philosophers think this too high a price to pay, and Ehring doesn t directly mention it. </li><li>Ehring s approach is  to my mind  even more radical and even less acceptable. It is to challenge the non-identity of the  fission products . These products are usually deemed to be non-identical for (at least) three reasons:- <ol type="i"><li>the lack of shared consciousness, </li><li>the lack of a common body, and </li><li>the causal independence of the duplicates</ol></li><li>Ehring introduces these challenges  he intends to produce counter-examples to the claim that any of these necessarily lead to non-identity  by setting up a standard fission case: <ol type="i"><li>A brain scan of the dying Reagan is performed and a  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20895_7">restore</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20895_7"></A> of the information is performed onto two  cleared recipient brains. </li><li>Both recipients  according to the PV  are good candidates for being Reagan once the original has died. </li><li>Yet because of the logic of PID, neither can be  because both cannot be, and it would be unprincipled to choose <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20895_8">just one</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20895_8"></A> as the continuer. </ol></li><li>Ehring wants to reject the major premise in this argument  one that all writers hitherto have agreed on  that the  fission products are indeed two people and not one, accepted for the three reasons previously given. </li></ol> </li><li><b>Divided Consciousness and Multiple Bodies</b><ol type="1"><li> </li><li> </li></ol></li><li><b>Physical-Causal Independence</b><ol type="1"><li> </li><li> </li></ol></li><li><b>Memory</b><ol type="1"><li>Late on in the paper he alludes to Perry s patching up of the psychological criterion <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P20895_9">in</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P20895_9"></A> <a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5227.htm">Perry (John) - The Problem of Personal Identity</A>". See p. 19. </li><li> </li></ol> </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P20895_7"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20895_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_48.htm">Brain State Transfer</a>. </li><li>I find it doubtful that the consciousness of Reagan would be <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_38.htm">carried forward</a> (whatever the recipients might subsequently think). </li><li>The reason for this intuition has nothing to do with <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1003.htm">reduplication objections</a>, but with the mechanics of how a <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">FPP</a> is carried forward. </li><li>Hence, I think this TE is highly dubious. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P20895_8"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20895_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, this case  in this respect at least  is better than the  two <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">half-brain transplant </a> case (see <a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20899.htm">Wright (John) - Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel</A>"), where It might be quibbled that one (eg. the initially dominant) hemisphere is privileged. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P20895_9"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P20895_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This paper is Perry s Introduction to <a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_137.htm">Perry (John), Ed. - Personal Identity</A>". Most of it is irrelevant for our present purposes. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:27" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:27:43</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>