Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel
Wright (John)
Source: Philosophia (2006) 34: 129–142
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem.
  2. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem.

Sections
  1. The Fission Problem
  2. Existing Solutions to the Fission Problem
  3. Another Possible Solution to the Fission Problem
  4. Time Travel1 and Identity
  5. The Permissibility of Saying B=C: Eight Objections & Replies
    1. Saying that B=C violates the principle of the indiscernability of identicals.
    2. Saying that B=C is extremely counter-intuitive
    3. B will never become C, nor C become B
    4. Saying that B=C fails to do justice to the important role memory plays in personal identity
    5. The suggestion that B=C cannot coherently describe what happens when one of them dies and the other does not
    6. But isn’t this view incompatible with the doctrine of the necessity of identity?
    7. But doesn’t this view create problems for our notions of moral responsibility, and culpability?
    8. But the account offered here cannot deal with cases of fusion in a way that is remotely plausible
  6. Parfit’s2 Physics Exam
  7. Conclusions

Notes
  1. The Fission Problem
    1. Arises where a person splits in two and :-
      1. each is a possible candidate, and
      2. either would be accepted were it not for the other.
    2. The example is of brain bisection …
    3. See3 "Sperry (Roger W.) - Hemisphere Deconnection and the Unity in Conscious Awareness".
  2. Existing Solutions to the Fission Problem
    1. Williams: "Williams (Bernard) - Personal Identity and Individuation".
    2. Swinburne: See4 "Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory".
    3. Parfit5: "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons", pp. 245-280. Ie. "Parfit (Derek) - Why Our Identity is Not What Matters".
    4. Lewis: "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity".
  3. Another Possible Solution to the Fission Problem
    1. Why does Wright make no mention of "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel"?
  4. Time Travel6 and Identity
    1. For arguments over the possibility of time-travel, see
  5. The Permissibility of Saying B=C: Objections and Replies:-
    1. Saying that B=C violates the principle of the indiscernability of identicals.
    2. Saying that B=C is extremely counter-intuitive
    3. B will never become C, nor C become B
    4. Saying that B=C fails to do justice to the important role memory plays in personal identity
    5. The suggestion that B=C cannot coherently describe what happens when one of them dies and the other does not
    6. But isn’t this view incompatible with the doctrine of the necessity of identity?
    7. But doesn’t this view create problems for our notions of moral responsibility, and culpability?
    8. But the account offered here cannot deal with cases of fusion in a way that is remotely plausible
  6. Parfit’s7 Physics Exam
    1. See "Parfit (Derek) - Why Our Identity is Not What Matters", pp. 246-8.
  7. Conclusions



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3: Also, maybe "Sperry (Roger W.) - Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres".

Footnote 4:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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