<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume Two - Part 6: Normativity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20984.htm">On What Matters: Volume Two - Part 6: Normativity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Parfit (Derek).htm">Parfit (Derek)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume Two (The Berkeley Tanner Lectures)</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20984.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Chapters & Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol start = "24" type="1"><li>Analytical Naturalism And Subjectivism  263<ul type="disc"><li>82. Conflicting Theories  263</li><li>83. Analytical Subjectivism about Reasons  269</li><li>84. The Unimportance of Internal Reasons  275</li><li>85. Substantive Subjective Theories  288</li><li>86. Normative Beliefs  290</li></ul></li><li>Non-Analytical Naturalism  295<ul type="disc"><li>87. Moral Naturalism  295</li><li>88. Normative Natural Facts  305 </li><li>89. Arguments from 'Is' to 'Ought'  310 </li><li>90. Thick-Concept Arguments  315 </li><li>91. The Normativity Objection  324 </li></ul></li><li>The Triviality Objection  328 <ul type="disc"><li>92. Normative Concepts and Natural Properties  328 </li><li>93. The Analogies with Scientific Discoveries  332 </li><li>94. The Fact Stating Argument  336 </li><li>95. The Triviality Objection  341 </li></ul></li><li>Naturalism And <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_87.htm">Nihilism</A><SUP>1</SUP>  357 <ul type="disc"><li>96. Naturalism about Reasons  357 </li><li>97. Soft Naturalism  364 </li><li>98. Hard Naturalism  368 </li></ul></li><li>Non-Cognitivism And Quasi-Realism  378 <ul type="disc"><li>99. Non-Cognitivism  378 </li><li>100. Normative Disagreements  384 </li><li>101. Can Non-Cognitivists Explain Normative Mistakes?  389 </li></ul></li><li>Normativity And Truth  401 <ul type="disc"><li>102. Expressivism  401 </li><li>103. Hare on <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">What Matters</A><SUP>2</SUP>  410 </li><li>104. The Normativity Argument  413 </li></ul></li><li>Normative Truths  426 <ul type="disc"><li>105. Disagreements  426 </li><li>106. On How We Should Live  430 </li><li>107. Misunderstandings  433 </li><li>108. Naturalized Normativity  439 </li><li>109. Sidgwick's Intuitions  444 </li><li>110. The Voyage Ahead  448 </li><li>111. Rediscovering Reasons  453 </li></ul></li><li>Metaphysics  464 <ul type="disc"><li>112. Ontology  464 </li><li>113. Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism  475 </li></ul></li><li>Epistemology  488 <ul type="disc"><li>114. The Causal Objection  488 </li><li>115. The Validity Argument  498 </li><li>116. Epistemic Beliefs  503 </li></ul></li><li>Rationalism  511 <ul type="disc"><li>117. Epistemic Reasons  511 </li><li>118. Practical Reasons  525 </li><li>119. Evolutionary Forces  534 </li></ul></li><li>Agreement  543 <ul type="disc"><li>120. The Argument from Disagreement  543 </li><li>121. The Convergence Claim  549 </li><li>122. The Double Badness of Suffering  565 </li></ul></li><li>Nietzsche  570 <ul type="disc"><li>123. Revaluing Values  570 </li><li>124. Good and Evil  582 </li><li>125. The Meaning of Life  596 </li></ul></li><li><a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">What Matters</A><SUP>3</SUP> Most  607 <ul type="disc"><li>126. Has It All Been Worth It?  607 </li><li>127. The Future  612 </li></ul> </li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:29" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:29:35</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>