On What Matters: Volume Two - Part 6: Normativity
Parfit (Derek)
Source: Parfit (Derek) - On What Matters: Volume Two (The Berkeley Tanner Lectures)
Paper - Abstract

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Chapters & Sections

  1. Analytical Naturalism And Subjectivism – 263
    • 82. Conflicting Theories – 263
    • 83. Analytical Subjectivism about Reasons – 269
    • 84. The Unimportance of Internal Reasons – 275
    • 85. Substantive Subjective Theories – 288
    • 86. Normative Beliefs – 290
  2. Non-Analytical Naturalism – 295
    • 87. Moral Naturalism – 295
    • 88. Normative Natural Facts – 305
    • 89. Arguments from 'Is' to 'Ought' – 310
    • 90. Thick-Concept Arguments – 315
    • 91. The Normativity Objection – 324
  3. The Triviality Objection – 328
    • 92. Normative Concepts and Natural Properties – 328
    • 93. The Analogies with Scientific Discoveries – 332
    • 94. The Fact Stating Argument – 336
    • 95. The Triviality Objection – 341
  4. Naturalism And Nihilism1 – 357
    • 96. Naturalism about Reasons – 357
    • 97. Soft Naturalism – 364
    • 98. Hard Naturalism – 368
  5. Non-Cognitivism And Quasi-Realism – 378
    • 99. Non-Cognitivism – 378
    • 100. Normative Disagreements – 384
    • 101. Can Non-Cognitivists Explain Normative Mistakes? – 389
  6. Normativity And Truth – 401
    • 102. Expressivism – 401
    • 103. Hare on What Matters2 – 410
    • 104. The Normativity Argument – 413
  7. Normative Truths – 426
    • 105. Disagreements – 426
    • 106. On How We Should Live – 430
    • 107. Misunderstandings – 433
    • 108. Naturalized Normativity – 439
    • 109. Sidgwick's Intuitions – 444
    • 110. The Voyage Ahead – 448
    • 111. Rediscovering Reasons – 453
  8. Metaphysics – 464
    • 112. Ontology – 464
    • 113. Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism – 475
  9. Epistemology – 488
    • 114. The Causal Objection – 488
    • 115. The Validity Argument – 498
    • 116. Epistemic Beliefs – 503
  10. Rationalism – 511
    • 117. Epistemic Reasons – 511
    • 118. Practical Reasons – 525
    • 119. Evolutionary Forces – 534
  11. Agreement – 543
    • 120. The Argument from Disagreement – 543
    • 121. The Convergence Claim – 549
    • 122. The Double Badness of Suffering – 565
  12. Nietzsche – 570
    • 123. Revaluing Values – 570
    • 124. Good and Evil – 582
    • 125. The Meaning of Life – 596
  13. What Matters3 Most – 607
    • 126. Has It All Been Worth It? – 607
    • 127. The Future – 612

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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