- The aim so far has been to set up some resistance to BTA by targeting the fourth premise in it. That premise simply expresses an intuition about what happens to the person, to things of our sort, in such cases. Its credentials have not been strengthened by one argument for it that I have considered. It remains, then, a rational option in the light of its status and the real difficulties that rejection of (A) involves, to think that, on the balance of all the evidence, the intuition it represents is not trustworthy. By not being trustworthy I mean not being such that we are entitled to trust it.
- This response would clearly be strengthened if we could develop more general grounds for scepticism about such an intuition. Now, to consider this line of thought is to raise a fundamental question about philosophical methodology, which is, however, far too broad an issue to pursue here in the way it deserves. It has, though, been argued by some that a case can be made for thinking that intuitions about brain transplants1 are not reliable. I want to explore two attempts to generate scepticism about these kinds of intuitions. The first attempt is by Kathy Wilkes, and the second by Mark Johnston. I have selected them because both are interesting and consideration of them enables, I hope, some general conclusions to be drawn.
- Wilkes's Criticisms of Thought Experiments2
- Johnston’s Criticism of Intuitions About Brain Transplants3
- An Alternative Argument
- A Remark About Intuitions
- Brains, Animals, and Reference
- A Second Revised Argument
- Other Transplants4 Briefly Considered
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