- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Reduplication Objections1' during my Thesis research, as from 2011.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 28/10/2018 18:08:38): Reduplication Objections
- The problem of reduplication relates to a systematic problem in the logic of identity, that of (potential) fission4.
- I have another Note in this general area, that of replication5. Is this the same issue? Maybe the latter Note will deal with what Replication is and how it differs from Identity, while this Note will deal with the problems it causes for potential solutions to the problem of Personal Identity.
- So, this Note is about an objection. An objection to what?
- The case is probably best put in "Seibt (Johanna) - Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit’s Branch Line Argument Revisited".
- Reduplication objections arise in various TEs6, especially
→ Brain-state Transfers8 and
→ Cerebrum Transplants9.
- These TEs argue that we either would not survive certain vicissitudes or cannot be certain things. So:-
- Teletransportation: you couldn’t survive because either the information can be used multiple times, or the original “you” might be left behind (the “Branch-line” case).
- Brain-state Transfers: you cannot be the mental contents of your brain, because they could be copied onto multiple “wiped” recipient-brains. This might seem to defeat the PV10.
- Cerebrum Transplants: You cannot be a brain, because idempotent cerebra (or maybe half-brains) could be donated to two recipients, who would have equal claims to be your closest psychological continuer.
- The force of these objections rests on the logic11 of identity as classically understood.
- Seibt herself thinks that Reduplication objections12 “entail according to Parfit13 a conceptual distinction between the notion of identity and the notion of survival”.
- As noted elsewhere, I hope this is a misunderstanding of Parfit. What he ought to be saying – and probably is – is that we can have most of what we want from survival without surviving. Because you - that very individual – don’t survive unless you are the very same individual pre- and post- whatever contingency is under consideration.
- Reduplication objections also arise in the abortion debate, and the argument over when “we” – assumed to be human animals – begin. The reduplication objection implies that this cannot be before the possibility of twinning is past.
- All these Reduplication objections are – I think – fully answered by adopting Perdurantism14, though there might be other objections to the stances adopted.
- For a page of Links15 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read16, include17 the following:-
- "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel", Ehring
- "Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem", Noonan
- "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", Olson
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", Shoemaker
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - Psychological continuity", Thomas
- "Thomas (Janice L.) - What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection", Thomas
- I don’t have a categorised reading list for this Note, and don’t really have a study-list to hand. Reading will be covered by the related Notes. However, a “starter pack18” might be:-
- "Berglund (Stefan) - Problems of Reductive Personalism", Berglund
- "Perry (John) - Williams on The Self and the Future", Perry
- "Seibt (Johanna) - Fission, Sameness, and Survival: Parfit’s Branch Line Argument Revisited", Seibt
- "Wilkerson (T.E.) - Minds", Wilkerson
- This is mostly a place-holder19.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (28/10/2018 18:08:38).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- In particular, “Branch Line cases”.
- If only a “non-updating” run has been made, the links are only one-way – ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven’t yet been confirmed as relevant.
- Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” and “Summary of Note Links to this Page” sections) are to the “point of link” within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the “links page” remain generic.
- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
- Arrived at by a rather slavish trawl through my database using the key-word “reduplication”!
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019