Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience
Plantinga (Alvin)
Source: Faith and Philosophy 27: 247-272
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. I take naturalism to be the idea that there is no such person as God or anything like God.
  2. Many philosophers hold that naturalism can accommodate serious moral realism. Many philosophers (and many of the same philosophers) also believe that moral properties supervene1 on non-moral properties, and even on naturalistic properties (where a naturalistic property is one such that its exemplification is compatible with naturalism).
  3. I agree that they do thus supervene2, and argue that this makes trouble for anyone hoping to argue that naturalism can accommodate morality.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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